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TURNOVER ACTIONS AND THE “FLOATING CHECK” CONTROVERSY
David R. Hague*
Abstract
When a debtor files for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, a Chapter 7 trustee is
appointed and is charged with collecting and reducing to money the
property of the bankruptcy estate. One of the most basic collection
methods a trustee possesses is its turnover power under § 542(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code. Pursuant to § 542(a), an entity in possession, custody,
or control, during the bankruptcy case, of property that the trustee may
use, sell, or lease, must deliver to the trustee, and account for, such
property or the value of such property.
An interesting issue has arisen that is placing debtors in very
problematic situations. Prior to filing for bankruptcy, debtors are writing
and issuing checks, but the checks are not clearing until after the
bankruptcy case is filed. Armed with the § 542(a) collection power,
trustees are demanding that the debtor replenish the bankruptcy estate
and turn over the account balance that existed on the date the debtor
filed for bankruptcy. But debtors are refusing to comply with this demand
because the funds represented by the checks are no longer in the
account. So who is responsible for replenishing the estate for the
transferred funds? Is the onus on the debtor to turn over the funds, even
if those funds have been transferred from the estate to the payees? Or
does the trustee bear the burden to seek the postpetition payments from
the payees of the checks through avoidance actions?
This Article examines the “floating check” controversy and the
language of § 542(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. It also examines a Chapter
7 trustee’s duties to maximize the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of
creditors. This Article then reviews one of the leading cases on the
floating check controversy, which holds that a debtor is not liable to the
bankruptcy estate for the value of the funds if she lacks current
possession or control of the actual funds at the time the trustee makes the
demand for turnover. Several courts have followed this decision. These
courts rely on pre-Bankruptcy Code practice and hold that turnover is
permissible only when the entity has possession or control of the
property at the time the turnover action is filed. Some of these courts also
justify their decisions with policy-based arguments, analyzing who is in
the best position to prevent transfers by postpetition check and remedy
the damages to the bankruptcy estate.
* © 2013 David R. Hague. Assistant Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law. I
would like to thank Professor Chad Pomeroy and Professor Stephen Ware for their helpful
comments.
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After examining these arguments, this Article uses the relevant
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code governing the status of
funds represented by an issued check to argue that a payee of a check
only obtains possession and control of those funds represented by the
check once the funds are available to the payee. This Article then argues
that the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code altered the pre-Code “current
possession or control” requirement because § 542(a) expressly permits a
trustee to recover “the value” of the property, in addition to the property
itself, from one who possessed the property at any time “during the
case.” As such, this Article concludes that if a debtor writes checks
against funds prepetition, but the checks do not clear the debtor’s
account until after she files for bankruptcy, the trustee is entitled to a
money judgment against the debtor for the value of the funds.
Finally, while this Article addresses the policy concerns, it raises a
new approach that courts have failed to consider. Instead of analyzing
who is in the better position to prevent transfers by postpetition checks or
which party is in the best position to remedy the damages to the
bankruptcy estate, this Article poses a simple question: which approach
for recovering the funds is in the best interest of the estate and its
creditors? This Article concludes that a Chapter 7 trustee has several
nonexclusive remedies and, in the exercise of her business judgment, may
choose whatever recovery method is in the best interest of the estate. At
times, recovering from the debtor might make the most sense because
such remedy allows the trustee to recover the value of all the prepetition
checks from one source and without having to commence a lawsuit.
Sometimes, however, recovering the funds from the payees of the checks
provide the greatest return. Not only does this approach comport with
the trustee’s duties under the Bankruptcy Code to maximize a return to
creditors, but it is what § 542(a) and the Bankruptcy Code allow.
I. INTRODUCTION
“Timing is everything in bankruptcy.”1 Shortly before filing for Chapter 7
bankruptcy, a debtor writes several checks from her checking account, but before
the payees of the checks present them to the bank for payment, the debtor files for
bankruptcy. A few days later—after the bankruptcy filing—the checks clear,
leaving only a few dollars in the debtor’s bank account.
When a debtor files for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, a new legal person—the
estate—is automatically created. A Chapter 7 trustee is appointed to act on behalf
of the estate and is charged with collecting and reducing to money the property of

1

In re Pauls, No. 10-13887, 2011 WL 6096292, at *1 (Bankr. D. Kan. Dec. 5, 2011).
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the estate.2 It is ultimately the trustee’s duty to collect property of the estate “as
expeditiously as is compatible with the best interests of the parties in interest.”3
One of the most basic collection methods a trustee possesses is her turnover power
under § 542(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 542(a) requires any entity that is
in possession, custody, or control of property4 that the trustee may use, sell, or
lease to turn that property over to the trustee and account for such property or its
value.5
In administering the bankruptcy estate, the trustee typically reviews the
debtor’s bank account statements to determine if there were funds in her account
on the date the debtor filed for bankruptcy. In the example above, because the
checks did not clear the debtor’s bank account until after the filing date—
postpetition—there were clearly funds in her bank account when she filed for
bankruptcy. As a result, the trustee files a turnover action against the debtor,
pursuant to § 542(a), demanding the debtor to turn over to the estate the account
balance that existed on the date the debtor filed for bankruptcy. Because the funds
represented by the checks are no longer in the account, however, the debtor refuses
to (or simply cannot) comply with the trustee’s demands.
Are the funds that the bank used to honor the checks property of the debtor’s
bankruptcy estate and, therefore, subject to turnover? If so, who is responsible for
replenishing the estate for the transferred funds? Is the debtor responsible even
though she no longer has control or possession of the funds in the account and
even if it means she will have to pay the funds twice—once to the payees to whom
the checks were originally payable and the second time to the trustee? Is the
trustee’s only remedy against the payees through separate avoidance actions? Or
does the trustee have the choice whether to recover from the debtor or the payees?
Nearly all bankruptcy court decisions addressing this floating check
controversy agree that if the funds are still in the debtor’s bank account on the
petition date, then such funds are property of the estate. But § 542(a)’s second
requirement of “possession, custody, or control during the case” is not clear-cut,
and courts have split over its interpretation. Some hold that the trustee bears the
burden to seek the postpetition payments from the payees of the checks since the
debtor no longer has current possession or control of the funds, while other courts
put the onus on the debtor to turn over the funds, even if those funds have been
transferred by the debtor’s bank to payees.
This Article argues that the latter courts are correct. If a debtor writes checks
against funds prepetition, but the checks do not clear the debtor’s account until
after she files for bankruptcy, the trustee—if she so chooses—is entitled to a
2

11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1) (2006). All future statutory references are to the Bankruptcy
Code as amended by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 (2006), unless otherwise noted.
3
Id. § 704(a)(1).
4
The “property” referred to in § 542(a) is essentially “property of the estate.” See id.
§ 541(a)(1) (defining property of the debtor’s estate as “all legal or equitable interests of
the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case”).
5
Id. § 542(a).
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money judgment against the debtor for the value of the funds. Not only does this
view comport with the plain language of § 542(a), but it also may be the most
practical and efficient way to maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate. Some
courts that have considered the floating check controversy fail to consider the
relevant provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) governing the
status of funds represented by an issued check. And several courts support their
holdings on pre-Bankruptcy Code practice without accounting for the text of the
current Bankruptcy Code. These courts hold that § 542(a) permits a trustee to
compel turnover only from entities that have control of property of the estate at the
time of the turnover demand. But what is absent in these courts’ decisions is
appropriate deference to the Bankruptcy Code’s language giving the trustee the
right to compel the delivery of “the value of such property”6 instead of the property
itself. Similarly, several courts take the position that the trustee is in a better
position than the debtor to recover funds from payees and, therefore, this somehow
obligates the trustee to pursue these payees instead of the debtor. Such reasoning is
flawed and inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code and the trustee’s duties to
maximize the estate as “expeditiously as is compatible with the best interests of
parties in interest.”7
Part II of this Article provides an overview of Chapter 7 bankruptcy. It begins
by discussing a debtor’s duties to cooperate as necessary to enable a Chapter 7
trustee to perform the duties given it under the Bankruptcy Code. One of those
duties is to use its ability to compel the turnover of property of the estate to the
trustee pursuant to § 542(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. This power is what entitles a
trustee to recover a money judgment against the debtor for the value of funds
withdrawn postpetition, even if the debtor no longer has possession or control of
such funds.
Part III of this Article examines the language of § 542(a) and the elements a
trustee would need to establish to prevail on a § 542(a) turnover claim. In addition,
Part III examines one of the leading cases siding with the debtor on the floating
check controversy—Brown v. Pyatt (In re Pyatt).8 This case holds that a debtor is
not liable to the bankruptcy estate for the value of the funds if she lacks current
possession of the actual funds at the time the trustee makes the demand for
turnover.9 Several courts have followed the Pyatt decision. This Article argues that
Pyatt’s reasoning is without merit and should not be followed.
Part IV argues that for a trustee to maintain a turnover action against the
debtor, the trustee need only prove that the funds in the debtor’s bank account are
property of the estate and that the debtor had control over the funds at some point
during the bankruptcy case. To satisfy these elements, Part IV uses the relevant
provisions of the U.C.C. and further compares the pre-Code “present possession”
requirement against the plain language of the current Bankruptcy Code.
6

Id.
Id. § 704(a)(1).
8
486 F.3d 423 (8th Cir. 2007).
9
Id. at 429–30.
7
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Finally, while Part IV addresses the policy concerns that have been raised by
several courts regarding the floating check controversy, it also raises a new
approach that has not been addressed by the courts. Specifically, Part IV poses the
following question: Which approach for recovering the funds is in the best interest
of the estate and its creditors? Several courts that analyze the floating check
controversy err in concluding that the crucial question is who is in the better
position to prevent transfers by postpetition checks or which party is in the best
position to remedy the damages. Rather than focusing on these issues, this Article
argues that the proper analysis is not necessarily which party is in a better position,
but which method of recovering the funds provides the greatest return to the
bankruptcy estate. The Bankruptcy Code requires the trustee to collect property of
the estate as expeditiously as is compatible with the best interests of the parties in
interest. As set forth in Part IV, a trustee has a choice of nonexclusive remedies. In
some cases, recovering the funds from the debtor will provide the greatest return to
creditors. But in other cases, recovering the funds from the payees might be more
efficient and in the best interests of the estate. The point is that a trustee has
options under the Bankruptcy Code, and the business judgment rule governs her
choices. This approach—and more specifically the trustee’s right to choose her
remedy—is supported by the plain language of § 542(a) and comports with the
trustee’s duties under the Bankruptcy Code.
II. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER 7 BANKRUPTCY
A. Bankruptcy—In General
To fully understand the floating check controversy, one must understand
general bankruptcy law. Bankruptcy law is federal law. “The substantive
provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 are found in Title 11 of the
United States Code and are referred to as the ‘Bankruptcy Code’ or simply the
‘Code.’”10 There are two overall forms of bankruptcy relief: (1) liquidation, and (2)
rehabilitation or reorganization. The Bankruptcy Code divides the substantive law
of bankruptcy into the following five chapters:11 (1) Chapter 7 cases, (2) Chapter 9
cases,12 (3) Chapter 11 cases,13 (4) Chapter 12 cases,14 and (5) Chapter 13 cases.15

10

THOMAS J. SALERNO ET AL., ADVANCED CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE § 1.4
(2013). The jurisdiction, venue, and administrative provisions appear in Title 28 of the
United States Code. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2006) (jurisdiction); id. §§ 1408–1410 (venue); id.
§ 1411 (jury trial); id. § 1452 (removal of cases from state courts); id. §§ 151–155
(judgeship provisions); id. § 156 (administrative/staff); id. § 157 (referral of cases from
district court to bankruptcy courts); id. § 158 (appellate procedures, creation of bankruptcy
appellate panels); id. § 1930 (filing fees); id. § 602 (creation of private panel of trustees);
id. §§ 581–589 (U.S. trustees); id. at § 959 (capacity of trustees to be sued).
11
11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532.
12
Chapter 9 is available only to a municipality and only by means of a voluntary
petition. Id. § 109(c).
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The availability of each of these chapters, however, is based on characteristics of
the debtor at the time of filing.16
“Bankruptcy serves to mitigate the effects of financial failure.”17 For debtors
who are individuals, the Bankruptcy Code affords the possibility of a fresh start
through the bankruptcy discharge, as well as the ability to restructure their debts in
certain circumstances. The Supreme Court of the United States has long stated that
“[t]he principal purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to grant a ‘fresh start’ to the
‘honest but unfortunate debtor.’”18
While state law focuses on individual action by a particular creditor and puts a
premium on quick action by that creditor (e.g., the first creditor to execute on the
property wins), bankruptcy, on the other hand, compels more of a collective
creditor action and emphasizes equality of treatment, rather than a sprint to the
courthouse and to the debtor’s assets.19 Indeed, after a debtor files for bankruptcy,
a creditor cannot improve its position vis-à-vis other creditors by seizing assets of
the debtor or taking further action against the debtor or the property of the estate to
13

Chapters 11 and 13 deal generally with debtor rehabilitation or reorganization, not
liquidation of the debtor’s assets. DAVID G. EPSTEIN, BANKRUPTCY AND RELATED LAW IN
A NUTSHELL 21 (8th ed. 2013). Typically, in a Chapter 11 or 13 case creditors look to
future earnings of the debtor, not the property of the debtor at the time of the bankruptcy
petition, to satisfy their claims. The debtor usually retains its assets and makes payments to
creditors pursuant to a court-approved plan. Chapter 11, like 7, is available to all forms of
debtors—individuals, partnerships, and corporations. Chapter 13, on the other hand, can
only be used by individuals with regular income who have unsecured, noncontingent, and
liquidated debts of less than $360,475 (adjusted periodically) and secured debts of less than
$1,081,400 (adjusted periodically). 11 U.S.C. § 109(e); id. § 104 note (Supp. 2011)
(adjustment of dollar amounts).
14
Chapter 12 was added in 1986 because of what was perceived to be a major
economic crisis in the farming community, particularly with respect to farms that had been
held in the family over a long period of time. It was difficult or impossible for the farmer to
use Chapter 11 because the absolute priority rule would require the farmer to give up all
equity in the property to the mortgagee when loan payments went into default. J. David
Aiken, Chapter 12 Family Farmer Bankruptcy, 66 NEB. L. REV. 632, 632 (1987).
15
11 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1330 (2006).
16
The focus of this Article is on Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Turnover actions under §
542(a) of the Bankruptcy Code are predominantly commenced by trustees in Chapter 7
bankruptcy, and nearly every court to address the floating check controversy has done so in
Chapter 7 cases. In Chapter 11 and 13 cases, the debtor is typically allowed to keep her
property through a reorganization. Accordingly, the issue presented by this Article
typically does not arise in Chapter 11 and 13 cases.
17
1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1.01[1], at 1-4 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer
eds., 16th ed. 2012).
18
Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007) (quoting Grogan v.
Garner, 498 U. S. 279, 286, 287 (1991)); see also Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234,
244 (1934) (“One of the primary purposes of the bankruptcy act is to ‘relieve the honest
debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh . . . .’”
(quoting Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554–55 (1914))).
19
See EPSTEIN, supra note 13, at 44.
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collect its claims.20 To that end, the filing of a bankruptcy petition automatically
stays, that is, it “restrains, creditors from taking further action against the debtor,
the property of the debtor, or the property of the estate to collect their claims.”21
The automatic stay is one of the most important protections in the Bankruptcy
Code.22 Obtaining the protections of the automatic stay is often the primary reason
for filing a bankruptcy petition. Congress, in enacting the Bankruptcy Code, was
quite clear as to the purpose of the stay:
The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections
provided by the bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell
from his creditors. It stops all collection efforts, all harassment, and all
foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor to attempt a repayment or
reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial pressures
that drove him into bankruptcy.23
The stay is also fundamental to other policies underlying the Bankruptcy
Code: equal distribution to creditors of equal priority and orderly administration of
the estate.24 It ends the state law policy of a “race to the court house” or “first
come, first serve” and replaces it with the Bankruptcy Code policy of equal
treatment to similarly situated creditors.25

20

Id.
Id.
22
The automatic stay is so named because it becomes effective automatically upon
the filing of a bankruptcy petition. The debtor does not have to do anything to make it
effective. The creditor has the burden of moving to get the stay lifted. It is no excuse that
the creditor did not have notice of the filing before the action was taken. The action will
still be set aside as void. See, e.g., Ellis v. Consol. Diesel Elec. Corp., 894 F.2d 371, 372–
73 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding summary judgment void where entered prior to lifting
automatic stay).
23
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340 (1977); see also S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 49–51 (1978)
(describing how the automatic stay “also provides creditor protection” by “provid[ing] an
orderly liquidation procedure under which all creditors are treated equally,” and further
defining automatic stay).
24
See, e.g., In re Curtis, 40 B.R. 795, 798–99 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984) (“The stay
insures that the debtor’s affairs will be centralized, initially, in a single forum in order to
prevent conflicting judgments from different courts and in order to harmonize all of the
creditors’ interests with one another.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
25
Generally, the automatic stay remains in effect until the particular property is no
longer property of the bankruptcy estate, the court enters an order granting relief from the
stay, the case is closed or dismissed, or a discharge is granted or denied. 11 U.S.C. §
362(c)–(d) (2006). Lenders have attempted to circumvent the automatic stay by including
provisions within loan documents that protect them from the automatic stay. Courts have
generally been loath to accept such provisions. See, e.g., In re Ames Dep’t Stores, Inc., 115
B.R. 34, 38 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990). Section 362 sets forth the categories of actions that
are stayed by the filing of a bankruptcy petition. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
21

70

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

The automatic stay is particularly significant in Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases
and in relation to the floating check controversy. Indeed, if a debtor files a Chapter
7 petition, the appointed Chapter 7 trustee needs time to collect the property of the
estate (e.g., funds in the debtor’s bank account) and make pro-rata distributions to
creditors. Continued creditor actions against the debtor and property of the estate
would inevitably interfere with the trustee’s orderly bankruptcy administration.
B. Chapter 7 Bankruptcy
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code is entitled “Liquidation” or “Straight
Bankruptcy” and is the most common chapter used by debtors. Its purpose is to
provide debtors with a fresh start. In a Chapter 7 case, a trustee is appointed and
her duty is to collect the nonexempt property of the debtor, convert that property to
cash, and distribute that cash to creditors in accordance with the distribution
scheme of the Bankruptcy Code.26 Essentially, the debtor gives up all nonexempt
property she owns at the time of the filing of the bankruptcy petition in exchange
for a discharge of all her debts.27
In a very simplified overview, the basic stages of a Chapter 7 case are: (1) the
Chapter 7 petition is filed, (2) the filing of the petition results in the stay of creditor
collection activity28 and the appointment of a trustee to administer the case,29 (3)
the debtor exercises exemption rights with respect to her property,30 (4) the trustee
collects and sells or liquidates any property available for distribution to the
creditors,31 (5) the proceeds from the sale of the property are used to pay
administration expenses and the claims of the creditors according to the
Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme,32 and (6) the debtor may be discharged from
any remaining prepetition debts33 that are not exempted from discharge.34

26

11 U.S.C. § 704(a).
The right to a discharge is not absolute, and some types of debt are not discharged.
For example, if the debtor has committed some bad act enumerated in § 727 of the
Bankruptcy Code, the debtor may not be entitled to any discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a).
Moreover, certain enumerated debts set forth in § 523(a) are not dischargeable. Id. §
523(a). Additionally, bankruptcy discharge does not extinguish consensual liens on the
debtor’s property. Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Young), No. 04-32102, 2007
WL 1159952, at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 2007).
28
11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
29
Id. § 701(a).
30
Id. § 522(b).
31
Id. § 704(a).
32
Id. § 726.
33
Id. § 727.
34
Id. § 523(a).
27

2013]

TURNOVER ACTIONS AND THE “FLOATING CHECK” CONTROVERSY

71

1. The Chapter 7 Petition
Debtors voluntarily file the majority of Chapter 7 cases.35 The process for
filing is fairly simple. The debtor files the petition, statement of financial affairs,
and schedule of assets and liabilities, all upon prescribed forms. Consumer debtors,
but not other debtors selecting Chapter 7, are required to pass an income threshold
referred to as the “means test.”36 The means test is a formula designed to keep
bankruptcy filers with higher incomes—or those that could feasibly fund a Chapter
11 or 13 plan—from filing for Chapter 7.37
The official forms and schedules list information required of the debtor about
present and past financial condition. “Much additional information is required,
some certified under oath by the debtor.”38 These include, among other things:
Identity documents; prepetition financial instruction by an approved
service; any budget payment plan worked out; copies of “payment
advices” such as paycheck stubs for the preceding 60 days; itemized net
monthly income; 12-month projection of income or expenses reasonably
expected; intentions for redemption or reaffirmation as to collateral held
under a purchase money security agreement; current tax returns; and
interest in any I.RA.39
A Chapter 7 debtor is also required to turn over bank records showing the
debtor’s account balance on the day of the bankruptcy petition.40 Indeed, the debtor
must “surrender to the trustee all property of the estate and any recorded
35

ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2010 REPORT OF STATISTICS REQUIRED BY
BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005, at 5
(2011); see 11 U.S.C. § 301.
36
11 U.S.C. § 707(b).
37
Id. Interestingly, only filers with primarily consumer debts—not business debts—
need to satisfy this test. Id. In other words, one can have a very high income and still
qualify for Chapter 7 bankruptcy if one’s debts can be classified as business debts. The
Bankruptcy Code defines consumer debt as a debt “incurred by an individual primarily for
a personal, family, or household purpose.” Id. § 101(8). In determining whether debt is for
a “personal, family, or household purpose” under § 101(8), courts look to the purpose for
which the debt was incurred. Stewart v. U.S. Trustee (In re Stewart), 215 B.R. 456, 465
(B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1997). Debt incurred for a business venture or with a profit motive does
not fall into the category of debt incurred for “personal, family, or household purposes.” Id.
Most courts conclude that the ratio of the dollar amount of consumer debt to nonconsumer
debt should be controlling in determining whether the indebtedness is primarily consumer
debt for purposes of § 707(b). Zolg v. Kelly (In re Kelly), 841 F.2d 908, 913 (9th Cir.
1988). Thus, if over 50% of an individual’s total debt arises out of a personal guaranty
agreement that was executed for a business venture or profit motive, § 707(b) would not
apply and the individual could file for Chapter 7 protection. Id.
38
RICHARD I. AARON, BANKRUPTCY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 27 (2012).
39
Id. at 28.
40
See 11 U.S.C. § 521.
THE
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information, including books, documents, records, and papers, relating to property
of the estate . . . .”41 Failure by the debtor to comply with these debtor duties and
supply this information within the appropriate time limits may result in dismissal
of the bankruptcy case.42
2. The Chapter 7 Trustee and His Duties
In every Chapter 7 case, a trustee is appointed. The Chapter 7 trustee is an
impartial person representing the collective interest of the creditors. A Chapter 7
trustee is active, controlling and administering the bankruptcy estate as “the
representative of the estate.”43 The trustee is essentially the successor of the debtor
and is entitled to collect and reduce to money the property of the estate. The trustee
also represents the creditors. In that capacity, he may exercise rights that would
have belonged to creditors before the beginning of the bankruptcy case. Some of
the trustee’s responsibilities include, among others, the duty to:
(1) Collect and reduce to money the property of the estate and
attempt to close the estate as soon as possible;
(2) Account for all property of the estate;
(3) Investigate the financial affairs of the debtor;
(4) If necessary, examine proofs of claim and object to the
allowance of claims;
(5) If advisable, oppose the discharge of the debtor;
(6) Furnish information concerning the estate and the administration
of the estate;
(7) File periodic operating reports of the operation of the debtor’s
business; and
(8) Submit a final report and file with the court a final accounting of
the administration of the estate.44
Another duty of the trustee is to conduct the first meeting of creditors under §
341 of the United States Code, often referred to as the “§ 341 meeting.” The debtor
is required to appear at the § 341 meeting and submit to examination under oath.45
The scope of this examination is very broad. Indeed, “[t]he purpose of the
examination is, generally, to ascertain the status of the debtor’s assets and
liabilities; to determine whether any avoidable or improper transfers have occurred

41

Id.
Id. § 707.
43
Id. § 323.
44
Id. § 704.
45
Id. § 343.
42
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or whether assets are being concealed, or whether there are grounds for objection
to exemptions or discharge.”46
With the opening of the bankruptcy estate, the trustee should begin to
promptly assemble the property belonging to the estate. This may include taking
possession of the debtor’s known bank accounts and books and records, seizing
vehicles and other property, changing locks at the debtor’s premises, and
reviewing the debtor’s schedules for nonexempt assets and potential avoidance
claims. In some cases, the trustee may need to collect property from the hands of
third persons, or perhaps noncompliant debtors in possession of estate property.
One of the most basic collection methods is the trustee’s turnover power under §
542(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.
III. SECTION 542(A) TURNOVER ACTIONS AND CASE LAW ADDRESSING THE
FLOATING CHECK CONTROVERSY
To understand the floating check issue, it is important to understand the
inception of turnover actions. Prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code,
turnover procedures were not prescribed by statute, but rather were considered
“judicial innovation[s]” derived from the notion that the courts were empowered
under the Bankruptcy Act (which governed from 189847 to 1978) to “cause the
estates of the bankrupts to be collected.”48 But the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court’s ability to recover property of the estate was limited. Indeed, “a court’s
authority to compel turnover under the former Act was limited to only its own
summary jurisdiction over the estate’s actual property.”49 The enactment of the
Bankruptcy Code, however, expanded the court’s authority to compel turnover and
recover property of the estate.50
In 1978, with the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, a substantive cause of
action for turnover of property of the estate was created by § 542. This section
allows a trustee to recover property of the estate in possession, custody, or control
of any entity. The statute provides, in relevant part, as follows: “[A]n entity . . . in
possession, custody, or control, during the case, of property [of the estate] . . . shall
deliver to the trustee . . . such property or the value of such property . . . .”51
46

Carla E. Craig, Step-By-Step Procedure in a Chapter 7 Case, in UNDERSTANDING
BASICS OF BANKRUPTCY & REORGANIZATION 173, 182 (PLI Commercial Law &
Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. A-842, 2002).
47
The Bankruptcy Act of 1938 significantly amended the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.
Bankruptcy Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840; Edward S. Adams & Daniel A. Farber,
Beyond the Formalism Debate: Expert Reasoning, Fuzzy Logic, and Complex Statutes, 52
VAND. L. REV. 1243, 1320 (1999).
48
Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 61 (1948).
49
In re Fleming, 424 B.R. 795, 804 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2010).
50
Shields v. Adams (In re Adams), 453 B.R. 774, 777–78 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2011).
51
11 U.S.C. § 542(a). The term “entity” under the Bankruptcy Code “includes person,
estate, trust, governmental unit, and United States Trustee.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(15) (2006).
Thus, nearly everyone is subject to the powers of § 542(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. See In
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The purpose of this section is “to expand the trustee’s power to ‘bring into the
estate property . . . at the time the bankruptcy proceedings commenced,’ ensuring
that a broad range of property is included in the estate in order to promote the
congressional goal of encouraging reorganizations.”52 This turnover power even
“reaches property in the hands of secured creditors.”53 Indeed, a turnover action by
a trustee “invokes the court’s most basic equitable powers to gather and manage
property of the estate.”54
A turnover proceeding may be brought as an adversary proceeding,55 by
service of complaint,56 or by motion as a contested-matter proceeding if it is
against the debtor.57 Although the Bankruptcy Code contains no express time
limitation for the commencement of a turnover proceeding, such an action may
nevertheless be time barred.58 An order granting or denying a trustee’s turnover
re Sawyer, 324 B.R. 115, 122 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2005). Some debtors have argued that §
542(a) is inapplicable by asserting that the word “entity” cannot include debtors since the
word “debtor” appears separately in the same subsection. This argument has failed. As
noted by one court:
“Entity,” which is a defined term, is a set of things, if you will, that includes all
individuals, partnerships, corporations, estates, trusts, governmental units, and
the United States Trustee. “Debtor,” in turn, is a subset of this larger group that
includes only individuals, partnerships, corporations, and municipalities.
Consequently, it follows that an individual like [the debtors] can be both an
“entity” and a “debtor” under the Code without contradiction. Or, conversely, it
does not follow, as the [debtors] would have it, that an individual debtor cannot
also be an entity within the meaning of the Code.
In re Fleming, 424 B.R. at 801 (citations omitted).
52
Braunstein v. McCabe, 571 F.3d 108, 116 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v.
Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 205 (1983)).
53
5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 17, ¶ 542.01, at 542-3.
54
Braunstein, 571 F.3d at 122.
55
Rule 7001(1) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure includes in the list of
adversary proceedings “a proceeding to recover money or property, other than a proceeding
to compel the debtor to deliver property to the trustee.” FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(1). Thus, a
trustee is entitled to proceed against the debtor via motion since the rule states that a
proceeding to recover money or property is an adversary proceeding unless it is a
proceeding to compel the debtor to turn over property of the estate to the trustee.
56
See id. 7003 (“Rule 3 F. R. Civ. P. applies in adversary proceedings.”).
57
See, e.g., Toledano v. Kittay (In re Toledano), 299 B.R. 284, 298–99 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that Rule 7001 specifically allows trustees to compel debtors to
turnover property of estate by motion rather than by adversary proceeding).
58
See, e.g., In re Fleming, 424 B.R. 795, 805 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2010) (denying
trustee from compelling turnover of tax refund under § 542(a) because trustee waited three
years before seeking to compel). As the Fleming court observed:
Bankruptcy courts are frequently described as courts of equity and laches is
certainly an equitable defense. But § 105(a) itself empowers bankruptcy courts
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request is a final order within the meaning of section 158, title 28 of the United
States Code; therefore, the district court has jurisdiction to hear any appeal from an
order granting or denying such a request.59 If a party, including a debtor, fails to
comply with a turnover order, that party is guilty of civil contempt and may be
punished.60 Furthermore, a debtor’s failure to turn over property and comply with
the trustee’s demand can also result in the revocation of her discharge.61
In analyzing a motion for turnover pursuant to § 542(a), “[t]he first question is
what precisely constitute[s] property of the bankruptcy estate on the date of

to “issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to
carry out the provisions of this title.” Moreover, the Supreme Court and the
Sixth Circuit have held that the Bankruptcy Code takes precedent over equity in
determining the bankruptcy court’s authority to act . . . . Therefore, while laches
may seem like a reasonable approach, the court concludes that it is better to
address Trustee’s delay with the tools already provided by Section 105(a).
Id. (citations omitted).
59
See, e.g., Prof’l Ins. Mgmt. v. Ohio Cas. Grp. of Ins. Cos. (In re Prof’l Ins. Mgmt.),
285 F.3d 268, 281 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that a turnover order “is widely regarded as a
final order for purposes of appeal”).
60
See, e.g., Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 59 (1948) (discussing contempt for failure
to comply with a turnover order); In re Shore, 193 B.R. 598, 603 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996)
(affirming contempt order for failure to comply with turnover order). The bankruptcy court
“may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the
provisions of [Title 11].” 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006). Section 105(a) “authorizes bankruptcy
courts to impose sanctions for civil contempt to compel compliance with a court order or
compensate parties for losses caused by noncompliance.” Scrivner v. Mashburn (In re
Scrivner), 535 F.3d 1258, 1265 n.3 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Mountain Am. Credit Union v.
Skinner (In re Skinner), 917 F.2d 444, 447 (10th Cir. 1990)). “The standard for finding a
party in civil contempt is well settled: The moving party has the burden of showing by
clear and convincing evidence that the contemnors violated a specific and definite order of
the court.” Knupfer v. Lindblade (In re Dyer), 322 F.3d 1178, 1190–91 (9th Cir. 2003)
(citation omitted). In Hansbrough v. Birdsell (In re Hercules Enters., Inc.), 387 F.3d 1024
(9th Cir. 2004), the court awarded civil sanctions, including attorneys’ fees, when the
debtor’s principal failed to turn over property of the estate. See id. at 1026–27. The
defendant in Hercules operated a gymnasium with several pieces of exercise equipment. Id.
at 1026. When the defendant removed the equipment from the gym, the trustee moved the
court to compel its return. Id. The court granted the motion and ordered the defendant to
turn over the equipment to the trustee. Id. When the defendant still failed to turn over the
equipment, the court ordered that he be incarcerated as a coercive sanction. Id. at 1028. The
court further ordered the defendant to pay to the trustee “an amount approximating the fees
and costs incurred by him as the result of [the defendant’s] misconduct.” Id. at 1027.
61
See generally Walsh v. Bracken (In re Davitch), 336 B.R. 241 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
2006) (discussing a revocation of debtor’s discharge for failure to turn over property of the
estate or disclose property of the estate).
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filing.”62 If the property subject to turnover is not property of the debtor’s
bankruptcy estate, the trustee’s § 542(a) turnover action will undoubtedly fail.63
A. Property of the Estate
“Section 541 embodies the essence of the Bankruptcy Code. It creates the
bankruptcy estate, which consists of all of the property that will be subject to the
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.”64 “It is from this central core of estate
property that the creditors will be paid.”65 Congress’s intent was to make the
bankruptcy estate as “inclusive as possible”66 and to construe it generously.67
Indeed, the property of the estate includes, but is not limited to, “‘all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the
[bankruptcy] case,’ wherever located and by whomever held.”68 “It would be hard
to imagine language that would be more encompassing.”69 Section 541(b)
enumerates those items that are specifically excluded from being property of the
estate. These exclusions are narrow.70
“Even though section 541 provides the framework for determining the scope
of the debtor’s estate and what property will be included in the estate, it does not

62

Ruiz v. Jubber (In re Ruiz), 455 B.R. 745, 748 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2011).
In seeking the entry of a turnover order, the burden is on the trustee to show that the
property or proceeds are part of the bankruptcy estate. See Maggio, 333 U.S. at 64; see also
Rish Equip. Co. v. Joe Necessary & Son, Inc. (In re Joe Necessary & Son, Inc.), 475 F.
Supp. 610, 613 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1979). The general rule is that “[t]he trustee succeeds
only to such rights as the bankrupt possessed; and the trustee is subject to all claims and
defenses which might have been asserted against the bankrupt but for the filing of the
petition.” Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 101 (1966).
64
5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 17, ¶ 541.01, at 541-10.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
See Baer v. Jones (In re Montgomery), 224 F.3d 1193, 1194 (10th Cir. 2000).
68
Parks v. FIA Card Servs. (In re Marshall), 550 F.3d 1251, 1255 (10th Cir. 2008)
(alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2006)).
69
5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 17, ¶ 541.01, at 541-10.
70
Id. ¶ 541.01, at 541-10 to -11 (“Enumerated exclusions consist of powers that the
debtor may exercise solely for another’s benefit, any interest of the debtor as lessee under a
lease of nonresidential real property after the expiration of the lease term, the debtor’s
eligibility to participate in Higher Education Act programs or accreditation or licensure
status as an educational institution, certain interests in liquid or gaseous hydrocarbons,
funds placed in a Coverdell Education Savings Account, the debtor’s interest in funds used
to purchase certain tuition benefits, the debtor’s interest in amounts withheld from wages or
contributed by the debtor to certain employee benefit or deferred compensation plans, the
debtor’s interest in property subject to possessory pledges to certain licensed lenders, such
as pawnbrokers, and certain cash or equivalent proceeds from the sale of a money order
made within fourteen days prior to the commencement of the case if the proceeds are
required to be segregated from the debtor’s other property.”).
63
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provide any rules for determining whether the debtor has an interest in property in
the first place.”71 The Supreme Court of the United States has stated,
Congress has generally left the determination of property rights in
the assets of the bankruptcy’s estate to state law. . . . Unless some federal
interest requires a different result, there is no reason why such interests
should be analyzed differently simply because an interested party is
involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.72
Section 541(a) also includes any property recovered by the trustee using the
turnover powers conferred by § 542. Indeed, Congress intended to include a broad
range of “property in the estate,” subject to turnover.73 The United States Supreme
Court has stated: “Although these statutes [(§§ 542(a), 363(a) and (b), and
541(a)(1))] could be read to limit the estate to those ‘interests of the debtor in
property’ at the time of the filing of the petition, we view them as a definition of
what is included in the estate, rather than as a limitation.”74
With respect to funds in a debtor’s bank account on the petition date, nearly
all courts that have addressed the floating check issue—even those siding with the
debtor—agree that if the funds are present in the debtor’s account, such funds are
property of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.75 A small minority of courts, however,
hold that the funds themselves are not property of the estate, but rather it is the
debtor’s right to collect the funds from the bank that constitutes property of the
estate.76 As stated by one court, the debtor
did not own the money in the account, but was merely a creditor of
Merrill Lynch . . . . Property of the debtor is defined to include “all legal
or equitable interests of the debtor,” and obviously includes the interest
that a depositor has in the money in his account, more precisely the
money owed him by the bank by virtue of the account.77

71

Id. ¶ 541.03, at 541-15.
Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54–55 (1979).
73
United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 204 (1983).
74
Id. at 203.
75
See cases cited infra note 95.
76
E.g., In re Ruiz, 440 B.R. 197, 201 (Bankr. D. Utah 2010) (“Zions Bank was in
possession, custody and control of the funds on deposit and the funds belonged to Zions
Bank on the petition date. The Debtors were in possession, custody, and control of a
promise to pay from the bank to the Debtors.”), rev’d, 455 B.R. 745 (B.A.P. 10th Cir.
2011).
77
Boyer v. Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, P.A. (In re USA
Diversified Prods., Inc.), 100 F.3d 53, 55 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)
(2006)).
72
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This minority view is flawed because it attempts to narrow the scope of § 541 (i.e.,
property of the estate). In at least one decision addressing this issue,78 the court’s
narrow holding that the estate’s interest in the checking account amounted to
nothing more than a beneficial interest in the bank’s promise to pay the funds held
in the account (as opposed to the money in the account), was derived from
language contained in the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Citizens Bank
of Maryland v. Strumpf.79
In Strumpf, a debtor had both a checking account and a delinquent loan with a
creditor bank on the petition date.80 When the debtor filed the bankruptcy petition,
the bank placed an administrative hold on that part of the funds contained in the
checking account required to offset any prepetition debt that the debtor owed the
bank on the loan.81 The debtor brought an action against the bank, alleging that the
bank had violated the automatic stay because the administrative hold was actually
an improper setoff of the debtor’s funds in violation of § 362(a)(7)82 of the
Bankruptcy Code.83 The Supreme Court held that the bank’s actions did not
constitute a setoff, and thus it had not violated the automatic stay.84 Following that
holding, the Supreme Court also briefly dismissed the debtor’s contentions that the
bank had violated the automatic stay, noting that the bank did not actually take
possession of any of the debtor’s property or exercise control over the debtor’s
property.85 Rather, the Court held that the bank merely failed to perform its
promise to pay the debtor the funds held in the account.86
From the Strumpf holding, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District
of Utah in In re Ruiz took a very narrow view, holding:
[Strumpf] makes clear that funds held on deposit in a debtor’s bank
account do not belong to the debtor and do not belong to the bankruptcy
estate. Funds held by a bank consists of nothing more or less than a
promise to pay, from the bank to the depositor. [Debtors’ bank] was in
possession, custody and control of the funds on deposit and the funds
belonged to [Debtors’ bank]. The Debtors were in possession, custody,
and control of a promise to pay from the bank to the Debtors.87
78

In re Ruiz, 440 B.R. at 197.
516 U.S. 16 (1995).
80
Id. at 17.
81
Id. at 17–18.
82
The automatic stay prevents “the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor.”
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(7).
83
Strumpf, 516 U.S. at 17–18.
84
Id. at 19–20.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 21 (noting that a bank account “consists of nothing more or less than a
promise to pay, from the bank to the depositor”).
87
In re Ruiz, 440 B.R. 197, 201 (Bankr. D. Utah 2010), rev’d, 455 B.R. 745 (B.A.P.
10th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
79
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In rejecting this holding (and disagreeing with other similar holdings), the
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) of the Tenth Circuit stated that although the
language contained in Strumpf does “facially support Debtors’ position, the context
of that case is entirely different from the case currently before this Court.”88 The
Tenth Circuit BAP’s reason for rejecting the Strumpf holding in the context of the
floating check issue was that Strumpf “solely involved the automatic stay and the
relationship between the bank and the debtor. The issue of what constituted
property of the estate under § 541 was neither argued nor decided.”89 For that
reason, the Tenth Circuit BAP stated that the “language in Strumpf is not
dispositive under the facts, or the [floating check] issue presented, in this case.”90
The Tenth Circuit BAP further held that the relationship between the bank
and the debtors was “considerably different than the typical debtor-creditor
relationship that existed in Strumpf.”91 Indeed, the “[d]ebtors maintained the right
to withdraw the funds in their account at any time, to direct [their bank] to deliver
the funds to any third party, or to leave the funds on deposit.”92 The court further
concluded that “although [the bank] did make a promise to pay the funds in the
account to the debtors, the checking account constituted much more than that
promise and Debtors’ rights to those funds exceeded those of a typical creditor.”93
Finally, the Tenth Circuit BAP recognized that the scope of § 541 (i.e.,
property of the estate) is broad “and should be generously construed” and that “the
bankruptcy court’s attempts to narrow the scope of § 541 in relation to funds on
deposit in a checking account does not satisfy the standard the Court must apply
when considering § 541.”94 With that, the Tenth Circuit BAP adopted the
“prevailing view of nearly every court to consider this issue by holding that the
funds in [a Debtor’s bank] account, rather than merely the promise to pay over
those funds, constitute[] property of the bankruptcy estate.”95
88

In re Ruiz, 455 B.R. 745, 749 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2011).
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id. (quoting Williamson v. Jones (In re Montgomery), 224 F.3d 1193, 1194 (10th
Cir. 2000)).
95
Id. (emphasis added); see also Brown v. Pyatt (In re Pyatt), 486 F.3d 423, 427 (8th
Cir. 2007) (“[T]he funds transferred by the [prepetition] checks are property of the
estate.”); Yoon v. Minter-Higgins, 399 B.R. 34, 42–44 (N.D. Ind. 2008) (“Funds on
deposit, in a debtor’s checking account on the petition date that are not otherwise exempt
are property of the bankruptcy estate.”); Maurer v. Hedback (In re Maurer), 140 B.R. 744,
746 (D. Minn. 1992) (holding that prepetition checks remain property of the estate until
honored); Shapiro v. Henson (In re Henson), 449 B.R. 109, 112 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2011)
(“The bankruptcy court held that the checks written pre-petition by Debtor became
property of the estate because they had not been honored when Debtor filed for
bankruptcy.”); In re Brubaker, 426 B.R. 902, 905 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2010) (“[B]oth schools
[of thought] agree that the funds are property of the estate.”), aff’d, 443 B.R. 176 (M.D.
89
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While the issue of what constitutes “property of the estate” is rather clear-cut,
the second element of a § 542(a) turnover claim—“possession, custody, or control”
of that property—presents a thornier issue and one that has been the subject of
much debate.
B. Possession, Custody, or Control of Property of the Estate
After a court determines that the subject property is “property of the estate,”
the next question in analyzing a trustee’s turnover request is whether the party
subject to the turnover action had “possession, custody, or control” of that property
“during the case,” such that she can be required to turn over the property, or its
value, to the trustee pursuant to § 542(a).96 “While it is true that the phrase
‘possession, custody, or control’ is not defined in the Code, reading the phrase in
the context with the language of § 541 helps clarify its meaning and purpose.”97
Section 541 provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he commencement of a case . . .
creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property, wherever
located and by whomever held: (1) . . . all legal or equitable interests of the debtor
in property as of the commencement of the case.”98 “That language . . . indicates
the very broad scope of a bankruptcy estate.”99 Indeed, “Congress drafted the
sweeping language of §§ 541 and 542 deliberately to grant broad powers to an
estate and its trustee.”100
Fla. 2011); In re Parker, No. 05-17912, 2008 WL 906570, at *4 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Apr. 3,
2008) (“[T]he court concludes that on the date the Debtor’s bankruptcy petition was filed,
the entire $3,275.94 balance in the Trustco Account became an asset of the Debtor’s
bankruptcy estate under § 541(a)(1).”); In re Parsons, 57 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d. (MB) 273,
275 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Nov. 17, 2006) (“Funds on deposit in a debtor’s checking account on
the petition date . . . are property of the bankruptcy estate.”); In re Schoonover, No. 0543662-7, 2006 WL 3093649, at *2 (Bankr. D. Kan. Oct. 30, 2006) (“This Court has located
eight decisions that address this issue. As a threshold matter, all eight decisions agree that
the money [in the checking account] is property of the estate.”); In re Spencer, 362 B.R.
489, 491 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006) (“[T]he funds remained in [the debtors’] possession and
control at the date of the petition, were property of the estate, and were therefore subject to
turnover.”); In re Taylor, 332 B.R. 609, 611 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2005) (“[P]roperty of the
estate includes the funds in the account . . . .”); In re Sawyer, 324 B.R. 115, 121 (Bankr. D.
Ariz. 2005) (“Indeed, a review of Section 541 provides that the collected funds in the
Debtor’s account became property of the bankruptcy estate either pursuant to Section
541(a)(1) or (a)(2).”); In re Dybalski, 316 B.R. 312, 316 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2004) (“[T]he
Funds are property of the estate.”); In re Anderson, 410 B.R. 289, 295 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
2009) (“Funds in the debtors’ checking account, upon which no checks have been written
as of the date of the petition, are property of the estate.”).
96
11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
97
Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, P.A. v. Boyer (In re U.S.A.
Diversified Prods., Inc.), 196 B.R. 801, 808 (N.D. Ind. 1996).
98
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (emphasis added).
99
Carlton, 196 B.R. at 808.
100
Id. at 808–09.
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A handful of courts have held that funds in the debtor’s account as of the
bankruptcy filing, which were dissipated postpetition, are not subject to turnover
by the debtor pursuant to § 542(a), even though the funds are property of the
debtor’s bankruptcy estate. These courts hold that an entity cannot be compelled to
turn over property that is no longer within its “possession, custody, or control.”101
The leading case on this issue is Brown v. Pyatt (In re Pyatt). There, when the
debtor filed for Chapter 7 relief, there was $1,938.76 in his checking account.102
Postpetition, and before the trustee was appointed and could even make a turnover
demand, the debtor subtracted the amount of several prepetition checks written to
creditors when he reported the balance of his checking account apparently leaving
all but $300 of the $1,938.76 in the debtor’s account.103 The debtor’s bankruptcy
schedules reflected this asset in the sum of $300, which the debtor believed would
be the amount left in his account after all the checks cleared.104 At the § 341
meeting, however, the trustee learned of the true amount still in the account as of
the petition date, not considering the checks that were honored subsequent to
filing, and demanded turnover pursuant to § 542(a).105 The bankruptcy court
concluded that because the assets represented by the checks were still in the
debtor’s account as of the date of his filing, the trustee was allowed to compel
turnover under § 542(a).106
The debtor appealed to the Eighth Circuit BAP, which reversed.107 The panel
majority concluded that the trustee was in a better position to recover the funds
paid out by a bank to third parties after the debtor’s filing because the trustee was
authorized to avoid postpetition transfers pursuant to § 549 of the Bankruptcy
Code.108 The panel concluded that “[i]f the trustee were to recover the transferred
101

See, e.g., Brown v. Pyatt (In re Pyatt), 486 F.3d 423, 426 (8th Cir. 2007) (requiring
current possession); Lovald v. Falzerano (In re Falzerano), 454 B.R. 81, 86 (B.A.P. 8th Cir.
2011); Shapiro v. Henson (In re Henson), 449 B.R. 109, 112–13 (D. Nev. 2011); In re
Anderson, 410 B.R. 289, 295 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2009).
102
Pyatt, 486 F.3d at 425.
103
Id. at 426.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id. Section 549 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a trustee to avoid unauthorized
postpetition transfers, subject to certain exceptions. 11 U.S.C. § 549 (2006). The purpose of
§ 549 is to allow the trustee to avoid specified postpetition transfers that have depleted the
bankruptcy estate. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 17, ¶ 549.01, at 549-3.
Examples of postpetition transfers not authorized by the Bankruptcy Code or the
bankruptcy court that are recoverable by the trustee are payments to prepetition
creditors, including payments of penalties to a state agency, the placement of
judgment liens upon the debtor’s property, a deduction made from a debtor’s
wages to pay a credit union debt, a payment of a postpetition loan and a bank’s
setoff of funds to apply to prepetition indebtedness.
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funds, the claims paid by the checks could be reinstated and the recovered funds
could be distributed equally among all creditors.”109 “The concurring opinion
disagreed that the trustee [was] in a better position to collect” the funds, but argued
that “section 542(a) does not authorize any procedure used by the [trustee] because
the debtor no longer had control of the funds” and, therefore, could not be required
to turn them over.110
The Eighth Circuit affirmed, noting that § 542(a) of the Bankruptcy Code
requires any entity that “is in possession, custody, or control, during the case,” of
property of the estate to turn it over to the trustee.111 The Eighth Circuit in Pyatt
did not dispute that the funds transferred by the checks were property of the
estate.112 However, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the words “during the case”
fails to acknowledge the other language of § 542(a).113 While § 542(a) imposes an
obligation on any entity who comes into “possession, custody, or control” of
property of the estate after the bankruptcy petition is filed to deliver it to the
trustee, it says nothing about whether that obligation continues after possession,
custody or control cease, and does not specify whether an entity that lacks control
may properly be subject to a motion to compel turnover.114 The Pyatt court also
relied on pre-Code practice and the 1948 Supreme Court decision in Maggio v.
Zeitz,115 which held that possession or control of the property by a party at the time
of the turnover proceeding is required to compel turnover.116 Several courts have
followed, and continue to follow, the Pyatt holding.117 Pyatt’s reasoning, however,
Id. ¶ 549.03[1], at 549-11. With respect to the floating check issue, a trustee could clearly
recover the funds directly from the payees of the checks by pursuing avoidance actions
under § 549.
109
Pyatt, 486 F.3d at 426.
110
Id. (emphasis added).
111
Id. at 427.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 427–28.
114
Id. at 428.
115
333 U.S. 56 (1948).
116
Id. at 65–66.
117
See, e.g., Lovald v. Falzerano (In re Falzerano), 454 B.R. 81, 86 (B.A.P. 8th Cir.
2011) (“Moreover, the limitation . . . on the trustee’s right to turnover to the proceeds in
Rice’s possession comports with the Court of Appeals’ more recent ruling in Pyatt,
wherein it stated unequivocally that § 542(a) permits a trustee ‘to compel turnover only
from entities which have control of property of the estate or its proceeds at the time of the
turnover demand.’” (citation omitted)); Shapiro v. Henson (In re Henson), 449 B.R. 109,
112–13 (D. Nev. 2011) (“We agree with the reasoning in Pyatt, in which the Eighth Circuit
considered that argument and expressly rejected it. In the pre-Bankruptcy Code case
Maggio, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s contempt order on a debtor who was
unable to turnover property of the estate that it no longer possessed. In short, pre-Code
practice was that turnover ‘is appropriate only when the evidence satisfactorily establishes
the existence of the property or its proceeds, and possession thereof by the defendant at the
time of the proceeding.’ The Supreme Court further clarifies that courts should not look to
the date of bankruptcy as the time to which the inquiry of possession is directed, but rather
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is flawed. The enactment of the Bankruptcy Code altered the pre-Code “current
possession or control” requirement because § 542(a) expressly permits a trustee to
recover “the value” of the property, in addition to the property itself, from one who
possessed the property at any time “during the case.”
IV. THE TRUSTEE’S ABILITY TO RECOVER ACCOUNT FUNDS PAID POSTPETITION
Notwithstanding all that has been decided, it remains unsettled whether the
trustee can obtain the transferred funds through a motion for turnover against the
debtor, or whether he must seek postpetition payments from the payees of the
checks. Nearly all bankruptcy court decisions addressing the floating check
controversy agree that if the funds are in the debtor’s bank account on the petition
date, such funds are property of the estate. As the concurrence in Pyatt pointed out,
“there is no doubt that the funds on deposit in the debtor’s account when the case
was filed was property of the estate. This is true whether one thinks of that
property as cash, a credit of some sort, or a debt owed by the bank to the
debtor.”118 However, the second requirement of a § 542(a) claim (i.e., “possession,
custody, or control during the [bankruptcy] case”) is not clear-cut and the courts
that have considered this matter have arrived at completely opposite conclusions.
to the time that a turnover proceeding is instituted. In this case, Debtor does not possess the
property or the proceeds of the property.” (citations omitted)); In re Anderson, 410 B.R.
289 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2009) (“The Trustee concedes that under the Eighth Circuit’s
decision in Pyatt, a debtor is not required to turn over money represented by checks which
had been written prior to the bankruptcy filing, but had not yet cleared until after the
bankruptcy case was filed.” (citations omitted)).
118
Pyatt v. Brown (In re Pyatt), 348 B.R. 783, 787 (8th Cir. B.A.P. 2006) (Kressel,
C.J., concurring), aff’d, 486 F.3d 423 (8th Cir. 2007). Since the controversy surrounding
the floating check issue does not necessarily involve whether the funds in question are
“property of the estate,” this Article focuses on the dispute with respect to the second
element of a § 542(a) turnover action: “possession, custody, or control” during the
bankruptcy case. 11 U.S.C. § 542 (2006). It is important to point out, however, that while
the majority of courts that have considered the floating check issue have analyzed
“property of the estate” and “possession, custody, or control” separately, this is not
necessary and, perhaps, is a flawed method. When most bankruptcy courts analyze the
issue of “property of the estate” in other contexts, they focus heavily on the concept of
dominion and control. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit has held that dominion and control over
property are the hallmarks for determining whether property is property of a bankruptcy
estate. See Parks v. FIA Card Servs., N.A. (In re Marshall), 550 F.3d 1251, 1255 (10th Cir.
2008) (“[A] transfer of property will be a transfer of ‘an interest of the debtor in property’
if the debtor exercised dominion or control over the transferred property.” (citation
omitted)); In re Amdura Corp., 75 F.3d 1447, 1451 (10th Cir. 1996); Amdura Nat’l Distrib.
v. Amdura Corp., (In re Paige), 413 B.R. 882, 909 (Bankr. D. Utah 2009) (“The Tenth
Circuit has interpreted [section 541] to mean that property that is titled in the name of the
debtor and that is under the debtor’s ‘dominion or control’ is presumptively property of the
estate.”). Accordingly, one might argue that the courts are putting the cart before the horse,
so to speak, since a determination of what constitutes “property of the estate” can
oftentimes be made by first analyzing the issue of dominion and control.
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Some hold that the trustee bears the burden to seek the postpetition payments from
the payees of the checks through avoidance actions, while others put the onus on
the debtor to turn over the funds, even if those funds have been transferred from
the estate to payees.
As set forth below, § 542(a) not only entitles the trustee to recover from the
debtor, but it may also be the best method of maximizing the estate and providing
the greatest return to creditors.
A. It Is Not Until the Checks Have Been Presented for Payment to the Debtor’s
Bank that the Debtor Ceases to Have Possession, Custody, or Control of the Funds
Represented by the Checks
The phrase “possession, custody, or control” is not defined in the Bankruptcy
Code. When construing a term (where not defined in a statute), it is proper for a
court to look to its commonly approved usage, an inquiry that is enhanced by the
examination of dictionary definitions. Black’s Law Dictionary defines possession
as “having or holding property in one’s power; the exercise of dominion over
property . . . . Something that a person owns or controls.”119 Custody is defined as
“[t]he care and control of a thing or person for inspection, preservation, or
security.”120 And control is defined as “the power or authority to manage, direct, or
oversee.”121 The phrase “possession, custody, or control” is disjunctive and only
one of the enumerated requirements need be met. Thus, “actual possession” is not
required.122
In the case of transferred funds from a bank account, given that a check is a
negotiable instrument, the most relevant provisions governing the status of funds
represented by an issued check, specifically as to who is in “possession, custody,
or control,” are those found in the U.C.C. Nearly all states have adopted the U.C.C.
by statute.123
119

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1281 (9th ed. 2009).
Id. at 441.
121
Id. at 378.
122
See, e.g., Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, P.A. v. Boyer (In re
U.S.A. Diversified Prods., Inc.), 196 B.R. 801, 809 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (noting that Congress
wrote the phrase “possession, custody or control” in the disjunctive rather than the
conjunctive); id. (“Nothing in the phrase indicates that an entity must have any kind of
‘dominion’ over the property in question . . . . So, while the law firm may not have had
‘control’ over the money since it could only transfer it pursuant to the directives of its
client, that did not prevent the firm from having ‘possession’ or ‘custody,’ which is enough
to make it subject to a turnover action under § 542. To interpret the phrase ‘possession,
custody or control’ as restrictively as appellant urges would fly in the face of the broad
intent and purpose of §§ 541 and 542.”).
123
See, e.g., AmeriCredit Fin. Servs. v. Long (In re Long), 519 F.3d 288, 297 (6th
Cir. 2008) (recognizing that the U.C.C. “has been adopted by most states”); ABB Power T
& D Co. v. Gothaer Versicherungsbank VVAG, 939 F. Supp. 1568, 1580 (S.D. Fla. 1996)
(noting that the “Uniform Commercial Code did not exist before 1952, and most states
began adoption after publication of the 1962 text”); United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 304
120
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Under the U.C.C., the payee of an ordinary, uncertified check only obtains
possession and control of those funds represented by the check once the funds are
physically present in the payee’s account.124 But simply because a check has been
issued, does not result in the drawer losing possession and control of the funds.
Article 3 of the U.C.C. applies to negotiable instruments.125 Section 3-408
provides that a “check or other draft does not of itself operate as an assignment of
funds in the hands of the drawee126 available for its payment, and the drawee is not
liable on the instrument until the drawee accepts it.”127 Thus, upon receipt of a
check by the payee, the drawer has not effectively assigned the funds in the
drawer’s bank account pending payment of the check.
Moreover, regarding whether the funds remain in the drawer’s account and
hence in the drawer’s possession or control up until presentment, § 3-501 defines
presentment as:
[A] demand made by or on behalf of a person entitled to enforce an
instrument: (i) to pay the instrument made to the drawee or a party
obliged to pay the instrument or, in the case of a note or accepted draft
payable at a bank, to the bank, or (ii) to accept a draft made to the
drawee.128

F. Supp. 955, 956 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (acknowledging that “nearly all the states have adopted
the [Uniform Commercial] Code”); Noland v. Wilmington Sav. Bank (In re D & K
Aviation, Inc.), 349 B.R. 169, 176 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2006) (stating that the U.C.C. is
effective “in most states”).
124
See U.C.C. §§ 3-408, 3-310(b)(1) (2002).
125
See id. § 3-102(a). “Negotiable instrument” means:
[A]n unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, with or
without interest or other charges described in the promise or order, if it:
(1) is payable to the bearer or to order at the time it is issued or first comes
into possession of a holder;
(2) is payable on demand or at a definite time; and
(3) does not state any other undertaking or instruction by the person
promising or ordering payment to do any act in addition to the payment of
money, but the promise or order may contain (i) an undertaking or power to
give, maintain, or protect collateral to secure payment, (ii) an authorization or
power to the holder to confess judgment or realize on or dispose of collateral, or
(iii) a waiver of the benefit of any law intended for the advantage or protection
of an obligor.
Id. § 3-104(a).
126
Id. § 3-408. “Drawee” means a person ordered in a draft to make payment. Id. § 3103(a)(4).
127
Id. § 3-408.
128
Id. § 3-501(a).
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Presentment has been construed as the point in time where the payee’s bank
presents the check to the drawer’s bank for payment.129 Significantly, after the
drawer issues the check to the payee, but before presentment of the check to the
drawer’s bank, the funds represented by the check undoubtedly remain in the
drawer’s account and under the drawer’s control. Indeed, it is not until presentment
that issuance of a check constitutes full and absolute payment.130
Other indications of “possession, custody or control” are found in Article 4 of
the U.C.C., which applies to bank deposits and collections.131 Specifically, section
4-403 deals with the “Customer’s Right to Stop Payment” and provides in part:
A customer or any person authorized to draw on the account if there
is more than one person may stop payment of any item drawn on the
customer’s account or close the account by an order to the bank
describing the item or account with reasonable certainty received at a
time and in a manner that affords the bank a reasonable opportunity to
act on it before any action by the bank with respect to the item described
in section 4-303. If the signature of more than one person is required to
draw on an account, any of these persons may stop payment or close the
account.132
Thus, a drawer of a check may issue a stop payment order at any time after the
check has been written in an attempt to prevent the check from being paid and the
funds from being transferred to the payee. This right to stop payment is clearly
indicative of the “possession, custody, or control” a debtor has over funds in a
bank account. A court should be hard pressed to deny that a debtor is not in control
over funds in her account if she can actually take steps to stop payment of the
check.133
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has confirmed that under the
Bankruptcy Code, a transfer of a check occurs when the drawee bank honors the

129
See Fla. Nat’l Bank at Perry v. Citizens Bank of Perry, 474 So. 2d 852, 853 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (using the term “presentment” in construing the exchange between
banks where the collecting bank would bring checks to the payor bank and request payment
for the checks).
130
See HENRY J. BAILEY & RICHARD B. HAGEDORN, BRADY ON BANK CHECKS 4-16,
4-19 (7th ed. 1992) (“Since delivery of an ordinary, uncertified check is only conditional
payment, dependent on the check being honored upon presentment, the check vests no title
or interest in the payee as to funds on deposit in the drawer’s bank account, and the check
is deemed revocable by the drawer until it is paid.” (emphasis added)) .
131
See U.C.C. § 4-101 (2010) (“This Article may be cited as Uniform Commercial
Code—Bank Deposits and Collections.”)
132
Id. § 4-403.
133
In re Schoonover, No. 05-43662-7, 2006 WL 3093649, at *3 (Bankr. D. Kan. Oct.
30, 2006) (“Debtors also do not, and really cannot, dispute, that they had management of,
or control over, the funds deposited in the accounts.”)
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check, not when the payee receives it.134 Accordingly, any time before a bank
honors a check, the funds represented by that check are within the “possession,
custody, or control” of the drawer (i.e., the debtor in this case).135
There are several other factors that demonstrate a debtor’s control over the
funds in her account. These include, among other things, the ability to (1) manage
the account, (2) determine when funds will be disbursed and to whom, (3) close the
bank account, (4) contact the bank and provide notice of the bankruptcy, (5)
withdraw funds from the bank, (6) use a debit card to purchase goods, and (7)
transfer funds from one account to another.136 Thus, there can really be no question
that if, on the day a debtor files for bankruptcy, the issued checks have not been
honored, the debtor has complete “possession, custody, or control” of the funds
represented by those checks. But this still leaves the question of whether that
“possession, custody, or control,” which may last for only a day or a few hours

134

Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 400–01 (1992). The issue of when a transfer is
deemed to have occurred is regularly discussed in the context of preferences under title 11,
section 547 of the United States Code. A trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the
debtor in property if the transfer (1) was made to a creditor, (2) was for payment of debt,
(3) was made while the debtor was insolvent, (4) was within ninety days before the filing
of the bankruptcy (one year if the creditor was an “insider” of the debtor), and (5) allowed
to the creditor to recover more than he would recover in a Chapter 7 liquidation. 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(b) (2006). The date the transfer occurs can provide a significant defense to a creditor
when litigating whether the payment was made within ninety days. Under Barnhill, the
“date of honor” rule, not of delivery, applies to preferential transfers under § 547(b).
Barnhill, 503 U.S. at 400–01.
In Brown v. Pyatt (In re Pyatt), the Eighth Circuit, citing Barnhill, found that the
debtor “had control over the funds before the checks were honored.” 486 F.3d 423, 427
(8th Cir. 2007). Remarkably, when deciding that the debtor was not responsible for
replenishing the estate, the Pyatt court did not dispute that the debtor had “possession,
custody, or control” over the funds at some point during the case. Id. The Pyatt court
recognized that before a bank honors the checks, the funds represented by those checks are
within the possession, custody, or control of the debtor. Id.
Relatedly, some debtors have argued that when a creditor presents a check for
payment postpetition, such act is a violation of the automatic stay. To the contrary, §
362(b)(11) excepts from the stay “the presentment of a negotiable instrument and the
giving of notice of and protesting dishonor of such an instrument.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(11).
135
See In re Parker, No. 05-17912, 2008 WL 906570, at *4 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Apr. 3,
2008) (“The recipient of a check has no right to funds in an account until the check is
presented for payment.”).
136
It is important to note that the floating check controversy and the § 542(a) analysis
are not questions of what a debtor should do, but what a debtor can do. The issue is not the
debtor’s duty; the issue is the debtor’s control of the funds in the bank account. The fact
that a debtor can perform all of these tasks, which no courts dispute, demonstrates that a
debtor has complete control over funds in her bank account until the moment of honor. It is
the debtor’s control that is the key for purposes of § 542(a), not what otherwise might be
her duty. It is important to note, however, that pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(4), debtors
have an explicit duty to “surrender to the trustee all property of the estate.”
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after the bankruptcy case is filed, constitutes “possession, custody, or control,
during the case,” which is required by § 542(a).
B. A Debtor’s Control of Her Bank Account Funds on the Date of Filing Requires
the Debtor to Deliver to the Trustee Such Funds or the Value of Such Funds
As set forth above, several courts make the argument that funds in the
debtor’s account as of the bankruptcy filing, which were dissipated postpetition,
are not subject to turnover by the debtor pursuant to § 542(a).137 These courts base
their decisions upon flawed interpretations of the Bankruptcy Code and outdated
common practice under the former Bankruptcy Act. Regarding the former, these
courts conclude that § 542 has to be interpreted as permitting recovery against only
a person who is currently in possession or control of the subject property at the
time of the turnover action—otherwise, there could be an unintended double
recovery. In Pyatt, for example, the Eighth Circuit made the following conclusion:
Here, both the debtor and the debtor’s payees had “possession,
custody, or control” of the funds at some point after the bankruptcy
petition was filed. Under the trustee’s reading of the provision, the
trustee could proceed both against the debtor and against the payees and
obtain double satisfaction. The code’s drafters apparently did not think it
necessary to prevent the trustee from obtaining double satisfaction under
§ 542(a). Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 550(d) (prohibiting double satisfaction in
avoidances under §§ 544, 545, 547–549, 553(b), and 724(a); no mention
of § 542(a)). The absence of such a prohibition suggests that the drafters
did not intend to authorize a trustee to proceed under § 542(a) against
everyone who may have had control over property of the estate at some
point after the petition was filed.138
This argument raised in Pyatt and the meaning of § 550 of the Bankruptcy
Code needs further explanation. Pyatt (and other cases) cites to § 550 of the
Bankruptcy Code for support that an unintended double recovery might occur if a

137

See, e.g., Lovald v. Falzerano (In re Falzerano), 454 B.R. 81, 86 (B.A.P. 8th Cir.
2011) (holding that § 542(a) permits a trustee to compel turnover only from entities that
have control of property of the estate or its proceeds at the time of turnover demand);
Shapiro v. Henson (In re Henson), 449 B.R. 109, 112–13 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2011) (holding
that because debtor no longer had possession of the funds, trustee could not compel
turnover); In re Anderson, 410 B.R. 289 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2009) (“The Trustee concedes
that under the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Pyatt, a debtor is not required to turn over
money represented by checks which had been written prior to the bankruptcy filing, but
had not yet cleared until after the bankruptcy case was filed.”); In re Taylor, 332 B.R. 609
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2005) (holding that the trustee may proceed against the payees of the
checks and not the debtor).
138
Pyatt, 486 F.3d at 427–28.

2013]

TURNOVER ACTIONS AND THE “FLOATING CHECK” CONTROVERSY

89

trustee is allowed to pursue a debtor for the value of the funds transferred
postpetition. This reasoning is faulty.
Section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code permits a trustee, after avoidance of a
transfer under the trustee’s avoiding powers, to recover the property transferred or
the value of the property transferred.139 Section 550 applies only to transfers
avoided against subsequent judicial lien creditors and bona fide purchasers or
against actual creditors,140 avoided statutory liens,141 preferences,142 fraudulent
transfers and obligations,143 postpetition transfers,144 setoffs within the ninety-day
prepetition period,145 and liens secured by penalties.146 Under § 550, the trustee
may recover the property itself or, on court order, the value of the property.
Furthermore, the trustee may recover the property from the initial transferee or a
subsequent transferee. But the trustee may not obtain a windfall for the estate by
recovering from multiple transferees so that the recovery is in excess of the value
of the property transferred.147 “Subsection (d) recognizes the possibility that more
than one entity may be liable, but that the trustee’s remedy is limited to the
recovery of property or its value, and not damages.”148 For example, if “the trustee
could recover under subsection (a)(1) from either the initial transferee or from the
entity for whose benefit the transfer was made, the trustee may recover from both,
but only insofar as the recovery does not exceed the value of property or the
property itself.”149
Section 550, of course, does not mention § 542(a) because § 542(a) is not an
avoidance provision. So Pyatt and others150 make the argument that because §
139

11 U.S.C. § 550.
Id. § 544.
141
Id. § 545.
142
Id. § 547.
143
Id. § 548.
144
Id. § 549.
145
Id. § 553.
146
Id. § 724.
147
Id. § 550(d). Section 550(d) provides that “[t]he trustee is entitled to only a single
satisfaction under subsection (a).” Id.
148
5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 17, at ¶ 550.05, 550-27.
149
Id.
150
For example, in the recent case of Shapiro v. Henson (In re Henson), 449 B.R. 109
(Bankr. D. Nev. 2011), the court followed a nearly identical analysis as Pyatt, stating:
140

Finally, we note that under Trustee’s interpretation of sec. 542(a), Trustee
might have obtained double satisfaction by proceeding against the debtor
through a motion for turnover, and against the creditors through motions to
avoid post-petition transfers of property of the estate. If possession is not
required, nothing in sec. 542(a) or the provision governing double satisfaction
would prevent Trustee from doing so. Double satisfaction under sections 544,
545, 547, 548, 549, 553(b), or 724(a) is expressly prohibited under 11 U.S.C. §
550(d). That provision does not include any reference to sec. 542(a), and the
absence of such a prohibition lends credence to our interpretation that sec.
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542(a) is not mentioned, there is nothing that would prohibit a trustee from
obtaining a double recovery—once from the debtor and once from the payees to
whom the checks were transferred. This argument borders on the frivolous.151
It is ultimately the trustee’s duty to collect property of the estate “as
expeditiously as is compatible with the best interests of [the] parties in interest.”152
Spending additional time and wasting the estate’s resources to collect funds, which
the trustee has already obtained, would violate his duties under the Bankruptcy
Code. Furthermore, if a trustee were to actually seek a double recovery, the party
from whom the second recovery was sought could clearly raise equitable defenses
against such actions. Most, if not all, states forbid double recovery. Indeed,
[i]t is generally recognized that there can be only one recovery of
damages for one wrong or injury. Double recovery of damages is not
permitted, and the law does not permit a double satisfaction for a single
injury. A plaintiff may not recover damages twice for the same injury
simply because he or she has two legal theories . . . .153
Furthermore, if a trustee recovered from the debtor under § 542(a) and then
attempted a double recovery against the payee under § 549, what would prevent
the payee from asserting a § 550(d) defense and what court would allow a trustee
to obtain such a windfall?
Finally, Pyatt’s concern about double recovery is not remedied by the holding
that an entity is required to have current possession or control over estate property
to be subject to a turnover action. As correctly stated by one court:
[I]n a case where funds remain in a checking account on the date a
trustee seeks turnover, both the bank (which would currently be in
possession of the funds) and the debtor (who would currently be in
control of the funds) could be the subject of the trustee’s turnover
demand.154

542(a) requires present possession of the property or its proceeds. Our
interpretation would neatly limit the appropriate defendants of a turnover
proceeding and the possibility of double satisfaction without resort to an express
provision such as sec. 550(d), as well as being in accordance with pre-Code
practice.
Id. at 113 (citations omitted).
151
See In re Ruiz, 455 B.R. 745, 751–52 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2011) (“[I]t would be
extremely unusual for § 542(a) to be referenced in § 550(d), as a matter of statutory
construction. . . . Therefore, little, if anything, should be read into the failure to include §
542(a) in the provisions of § 550.”).
152
11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1).
153
25 C.J.S. Damages § 5 (2002).
154
In re Ruiz, 455 B.R. at 752.
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Accordingly, the double recovery that the Pyatt court and others fear could still
occur.
Another problem with Pyatt’s conclusion—and possibly even a greater
problem—is that it opens the door for serious abuse of the bankruptcy process.
Pyatt focuses on the remote possibility of unintended double recovery, but
completely ignores the consequences of its holding. If, as Pyatt concludes, §
542(a) actually permits a debtor to use or transfer property of the estate without
consequence, does this not open the door for debtors to game the bankruptcy
system? Indeed, under Pyatt’s reasoning, debtors may now be incentivized to
dissipate assets of the estate under the assumption that as long as they are not in
“possession” of the property, no penalties will follow.155 For example, in In re
Anderson,156 a case which follows the Pyatt decision, the debtors argued, “Pyatt
stands for the proposition that, even though funds in a [debtor’s] checking account
as of the petition date are property of the estate,” a debtor is “free to write checks
on such account post-petition, without consequence, up until the time that the
trustee makes demand for turnover of such funds.”157 Stated differently, if a debtor
is able to dissipate funds from her checking account before the trustee has a chance
to review her bank statements and make a turnover demand for such funds, the
debtor is off the hook—“the trustee must look elsewhere to recover those
funds.”158 While the court in Anderson essentially rejected the debtors’ argument,
it is further proof that Pyatt’s interpretation of § 542(a) is flawed and that debtors
will use Pyatt as a good-faith justification to game the system. Undoubtedly,
debtors and bankruptcy practitioners alike will read Pyatt to mean that a debtor is
free to spend or transfer estate funds postpetition until such time as the trustee
makes demand for such funds.159
155

This could, of course, jeopardize a debtor’s discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727. But

actual intent to hinder, delay or default must be established and as Pyatt itself
illustrates, it is certainly possible for a debtor to benefit from postpetition
transfers made without also [possessing] the requisite fraudulent intent.
Moreover, [denying] the debtor [a] discharge will not restore to the estate
property that otherwise could have been distributed to creditors.
In re Fleming, 424 B.R. 795, 802 n.17 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2010).
156
410 B.R. 289 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2009).
157
Id. at 295 (emphasis added).
158
Id.
159
Creditors would also have an incentive to game the system. See, e.g., Beaman v.
Vandeventer Black, LLP (In re Shearin), 224 F.3d 353, 357 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating that to
read § 542(a) as requiring current possession “would enable possessors of property of the
estate to escape trustees’ demands ‘simply by transferring the property to someone else’”
(citation omitted)); Yoon v. Minter-Higgins, 399 B.R. 34, 43–44 (N.D. Ind. 2008) (“[I]t
would be simple for debtors and aggressive creditors to game the system by writing checks
immediately pre-petition to pay selected creditors while remaining secure in the knowledge
that the trustees would be unlikely to pursue very small § 549 [unauthorized post-petition
transfers] actions. This in turn would result in an unfair distribution to those creditors the
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Thus, Pyatt’s argument regarding the potential of double recovery by the
trustee to support the requirement of current possession of property in a turnover
action under § 542(a) is without merit and should not be followed.160
Pyatt and similar courts also base their decisions on the former Bankruptcy
Act—despite the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978—as well as the preCode United States Supreme Court case of Maggio v. Zeitz.161 Pyatt made these
observations regarding the floating check controversy and pre-Code practice:
Precode practice suggests that § 542(a) permits a trustee to compel
turnover only from entities which have control of property of the estate
or its proceeds at the time of the turnover demand. Precode practice is
relevant in construing the bankruptcy code. It is especially instructive
when interpretation of a “judicially created concept” is at issue, and
turnover proceedings were an uncodified creation of the courts before
enactment of the current code.
The leading case on pre 1978 turnover proceedings is Maggio v.
Zeitz. There, the president of a bankrupt enterprise was ordered to turn
over property which he did not have. He was jailed for contempt when he
did not comply with the order. The Supreme Court held that the president
was not a proper defendant in a turnover action, for turnover proceedings
are permissible “only when the evidence satisfactorily establishes the
existence of the property or its proceeds, and possession thereof by the
defendant at the time of the proceeding.” The use of a turnover remedy
was inappropriate “if, at the time it is instituted, the property and its
proceeds have already been dissipated.” Precode practice thus required
control of the property at the time the motion to compel turnover was
brought.162

debtors chose not to pay pre-filing and defeat the Code’s policy of promoting a fair
distribution of the debtor’s assets.”); In re Fleming, 424 B.R. at 805 (rejecting the debtors’
“contention that they can in effect exonerate themselves from their responsibility to
account to Trustee for property that clearly belonged to the estate through the simple
expedient of having spent it”).
160
It is worth noting that the debtor may have to pay twice under any scenario. If the
trustee seizes the money from the debtor’s account, the result may be a bounced check. On
the other hand, if the trustee pursues the payees directly, the debtor may need to make
amends with the creditors depending on the nature of the debt. For example, if a debtor
made a payment to her mortgagee prepetition and the trustee seized the funds representing
the check to the mortgagee postpetition, the debtor would still have an obligation to pay the
mortgagee. Since the mortgagee is secured by the debtor’s residence, if the debtor wants to
remain in the property, she would need to stay current on her mortgage.
161
333 U.S. 56 (1948).
162
Brown v. Pyatt (In re Pyatt), 486 F.3d 423, 428–29 (8th Cir. 2007) (citations
omitted).
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Pyatt, however, does not adequately appreciate the differences between the
old Bankruptcy Act and the current Bankruptcy Code, which clearly altered the
pre-Code possession requirements. Furthermore, pre-Code practice is applicable
only if Congress, in enacting the Bankruptcy Code, has been ambiguous or the
pertinent code section (i.e., § 542(a)) requires additional interpretation. But
“[w]here the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code’s text is itself clear . . . its operation
is unimpeded by contrary . . . prior practice.”163
Section 542(a) provides that “an entity . . . in possession, custody, or control,
during the case, of property . . . shall deliver [it] to the trustee, and account for,
such property or the value of such property.”164 The plain language of this statute
provides that current possession is not a requirement under § 542(a).165 “During the
case” refers to the entire bankruptcy case, not just the moment a turnover
proceeding is commenced by the trustee.166 And what is further absent in Pyatt’s
and other courts’ decisions is appropriate deference to the ability of the trustee to
now compel, pursuant to § 542, the delivery of “the value of such property” instead
of just the property itself.167 Pyatt acknowledges that § 542 had no counterpart
under the former Bankruptcy Act, but rather turnover was a product of “judicial
innovation” derived from the general concept that the courts were able to “cause
the estates of bankruptcy to be collected.”168 But § 542(a) expanded the power to
collect assets of the bankruptcy estate. Indeed, § 542(a) now provides a much
163

Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 10

(2000).

164

11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
Hill v. Muniz (In re Muniz), 320 B.R. 697, 700 n.2 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2005) (“The
fact that a trustee cannot demonstrate a debtor’s possession of estate property at the time
the turnover action is filed merely means that his remedy becomes a money judgment for
the value of the estate property rather than an order for turnover.”).
166
Beaman v. Vandeventer Black, LLP (In re Shearin), 224 F.3d 353, 356 (4th Cir.
2000) (“We construe the language ‘during the case’ to refer to the entire bankruptcy case,
not just the adversary proceeding.” (citation omitted)); accord Boyer v. Carlton, Fields,
Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, P.A. (In re USA Diversified Prods., Inc.), 100 F.3d 53,
55 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying § 542(a) to “[o]ne who during a bankruptcy proceeding is in
‘possession, custody, or control’ of property” belonging to the debtor’s estate (emphasis
added)); Rajala v. Majors (In re Majors), 330 B.R. 880, 2005 WL 2077497, at *4 (B.A.P.
10th Cir. 2005) (unpublished table decision) (“The obligation to turnover extends not just
to property presently in someone’s possession, custody or control but to the property in
‘possession, custody or control during the case.’”); Redfield v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell &
Co., (In re Robertson), 105 B.R. 440, 457 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (stating that “[t]he statute
plainly applies to estate property that was possessed by anyone ‘during the case’, whether
or not they still have it.”).
167
11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (emphasis added). Were that not true, the holding that debtors
must repay to the estate the prepetition portion of any tax refunds received, even when the
debtor has spent the actual refunds monies, would be in doubt. See Barowsky v. Serelson
(In re Barowsky), 949 F.2d 1516, 1519 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that tax refunds
attributable to prepetition portion of taxable year was property of the estate).
168
Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 61 (1948).
165
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broader remedy than solely turnover of property held at the time of the turnover
proceeding, which likely occurs well after the filing of a bankruptcy petition. It
contemplates the likelihood that a debtor or other entity has had and subsequently
lost control of estate property.169
Furthermore, if the statute is read to require current possession of the
property, as Pyatt and other courts do, then what does the language allowing the
trustee to alternatively recover “the value of the property” even mean? Such an
interpretation runs afoul of the “longstanding canon of statutory construction that
terms in a statute should not be construed so as to render any provision of that
statute meaningless or superfluous.”170 Under Pyatt’s and similar courts’ reading of
the statute, “the value of the property” has no meaning.171 As appropriately stated
by one court:
[I]t is difficult for this court to read the trustee’s ability under [s]ection
542 to now recover the “value of such property” as an alternative to
recovering the property itself as simply a reiteration of what Maggio
recognized was a product of judicial necessity under the former Act.
Rather, the common meaning of the phrase “value of such property,”
when juxtaposed with the notion of the property itself being turned over,
suggests to this court as well as others that Congress intended to expand
upon Maggio, rather than to just codify it.172
169

See Boyer, 100 F.3d at 56 (“But by the time the trustee got around to demanding
the money from the law firm, the law firm no longer had it, so how could it deliver it to the
trustee? The statute, however, requires the delivery of the property or the value of the
property. Otherwise, upon receiving a demand from the trustee, the possessor of property
of the debtor could thwart the demand simply by transferring the property to someone else.
That is not what the statute says, and can’t be what it means.” (emphasis added) (citation
omitted)).
170
Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 506 (2000).
171
See Rajala, 330 B.R. 880, 2005 WL 2077497, at *4 (“[I]f a lack of present
possession, combined with an explanation, constitutes sufficient compliance, little, if any,
purpose would be served by the statutory alternative of requiring deliver of ‘the value of
such property.’” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
172
In re Fleming, 424 B.R. 795, 804 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2010); see also Boyer v.
Davis (In re USA Diversified Prods., Inc.), 193 B.R. 868, 879 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1995)
(“Proceedings under § 542 effectively combine both the summary and the plenary remedies
a trustee was required to pursue under the old Act, thus, allowing the pursuit in a single
proceeding of relief that previously may have required two separate proceedings.
Consequently, if the turnover defendant is still in possession of property of the estate, the
trustee may recover that property. If the defendant no longer has possession of property of
the bankruptcy estate, the court may inquire into the propriety of its disposition and, if
appropriate, enter a money judgment in favor of the trustee for the value of such property.
In effect, turnover proceedings have become what the Supreme Court noted they were not
under the old Bankruptcy Act. They are not only the means by which the trustee can
recover specific property of the estate and its identifiable proceeds, but also the means by
which it can recover ‘damages for tortious conduct such as embezzlement,
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The text of § 542(a) is plain. And “where, as here, the statute’s language is
plain, ‘the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.’”173
Funds on deposit in a debtor’s bank account are undeniably “property of the
bankruptcy estate.”174 The fact that a debtor writes checks against the funds
prepetition, but the checks do not clear the debtor’s account until postpetition, does
not defeat the trustee’s right to recover the full amount transferred under § 542(a).
If the checks do not clear the debtor’s account until after she files for bankruptcy,
the debtor undeniably maintained control of the funds “during the case.”175
Furthermore, the statute expressly allows the trustee to recover the “value” of such
funds representing the checks. Thus, all of the elements required under § 542(a) to
establish a claim against a debtor for turnover of funds that remained in the
debtor’s account on the day she filed her bankruptcy petition are satisfied.
Although one may be sympathetic to a debtor in this situation, the law simply
provides the debtor no valid defense to the trustee’s turnover action under § 542(a).
C. The Policy Concerns and the Best Interest of Creditors
Nearly every court to analyze the floating check controversy discusses the
policy concerns and the difficult position that the parties, particularly the debtors,
face.176 The reasoning relied on by courts to arrive at their differing outcomes
misappropriation or improvident dissipation of assets.’” (emphasis in original) (quoting
Maggio, 333 U.S. at 63)), aff’d sub nom. Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith &
Cutler, P.A. v. Boyer (In re USA Diversified Prods., Inc.), 196 B.R. 801 (N.D. Ind.), aff’d,
100 F.3d 53 (7th Cir. 1996).
173
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (quoting Caminetti v.
United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917)).
174
In re Parsons, 57 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d. (MB) 273, 273 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Nov. 17,
2006).
175
11 U.S.C. § 542 (2006).
176
See, e.g., In re Pauls, No. 10-13887, 2011 WL 6096292, at *2 (Bankr. D. Kan.
Dec. 5, 2011) (“The facts in this case are lamentable: an elderly grandmother’s attempt to
assist her granddaughter and husband by co-signing and paying their debts results in the
debtors being liable for funds they have repaid to her and that she, in turn, has paid to their
creditor. But unfortunate facts do not soften the outcome that the law coldly compels.
Randy and Ruth Ann Pauls had control of the $9,713.49 in their checking account on the
date of their bankruptcy petition and must be ordered to account to the Trustee for it as §
542(a) requires.” (citation omitted)); In re Brubaker, 426 B.R. 902, 907 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
2010) (“Although this Court has an enormous amount of sympathy for the pro se Debtors
there is nothing in the record to reflect that the Debtors were acting in bad faith or with
fraudulent intent. The Debtors simply seemed to be depositing funds, allowing debits from
their account by merchants, and writing checks in the ordinary course.”); In re Sawyer, 324
B.R. 115, 123 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2005) (discussing the “enormous amount of sympathy for
the pro se Debtors in this case who apparently acted in good faith”); In re Dybalski, 316
B.R. 312, 316–17 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2004) (“The result in this case, at least on its face,
seems rather unfortunate. . . . [T]he Code is primarily intended to give debtors a ‘fresh
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pertains largely to the parties’ respective duties under the Bankruptcy Code. Courts
also analyze which of the parties (i.e., the trustee or the debtor) is in the best
position to prevent transfers by postpetition checks and remedy the damages to the
estate caused by the transfers. This focus, however, misses the mark. Courts should
not be focusing on which party is in the best position, but rather what the statute
requires and which of the remedies available to the trustee provides the greatest
return to creditors and is in the best interest of the estate.
In Pyatt, for example, the United States BAP of the Eighth Circuit, in holding
that the responsibility for recovery of several unauthorized postpetition transfers
was properly placed on the trustee, and ignoring what was in the best interest of the
estate, held that the trustee was “in a better position to prevent transfers by
postpetition check because the trustee can do so without the risk of criminal
liability.”177 The court further held that “[a] trustee also is in a better position to
remedy the damage to the estate caused by postpetition transfers because the
trustee is the only party authorized by the Bankruptcy Code to avoid postpetition
transfers, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 549.”178 In addition, the court found that
start’ and to equalize distribution among like creditors. The Court does not believe that
either of these goals is well served here. The Debtors, who may not be in a position to turn
over the Funds, must essentially pay the same ‘bill’ twice, with perhaps only a marginal
benefit to the estate, while the creditors who received the Funds are able to retain them.”).
177
Pyatt v. Brown (In re Pyatt), 348 B.R. 783, 786 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006) (emphasis
added), aff’d, 486 F.3d 423 (8th Cir. 2007). The court further found:
A debtor, on the other hand, runs the risk of being prosecuted for writing a bad
check if he attempts to stop payment on an outstanding check on the eve of
bankruptcy. Even though the debtor would likely prevail if he faced criminal
charges for such conduct, presuming he acted without fraudulent intent, it is still
inappropriate and unnecessary to place the debtor between the “rock” of
possible criminal prosecution and the “hard place” of defending a turnover
action by the trustee.
Id. (citation omitted).
178
Id. (emphasis added); see also Shapiro v. Henson (In re Henson), 449 B.R. 109,
113 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2011) (“Nor is Trustee left without an adequate remedy under the
interpretation that a motion to compel turnover may only succeed when the entity has
current possession of the property. Unlike the turnover provision, which governs the duty
of an entity in possession of property of the estate during the case to turn over the property
or the value of such property, sec. 549 expressly provides that ‘the trustee may avoid a
transfer of property of the estate’ that occurs post-petition.”). The Pyatt court also
observed:
The bankruptcy court alluded to the possibility that the Debtor might recover
from the payees of the checks in the amount the court ordered the Debtor to turn
over to the Trustee, but it did not specify . . . any Bankruptcy Code provision
that authorizes a debtor to recover funds from postpetition transferees.
Pyatt, 348 B.R. at 786.
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“because a trustee is the only party the Code authorizes to recover postpetition
transfers, placing responsibility on the trustee for doing so under these
circumstances is also the only option that advances the goal of equal distribution
among creditors.”179
Finally, the court stated the following:
[W]hether characterized as concern for fundamental fairness or
practicality, it simply makes more sense to directly collect the
postpetition transfers from the creditors who received the transfers rather
than from the debtors who, presumably, innocently made the payments
prepetition. In a perfect world, there would be a place on a debtor’s
schedules or statement of financial affairs where outstanding checks
could be readily listed, thereby alerting the trustee of the possible need to
notify the bank to stop payment on those checks. In the absence of such
perfection, however, debtors should be encouraged to disclose that
information to their attorneys who, in turn, can communicate that to the
trustee in some fashion. And the transfers that slip through the cracks
could be avoided by the trustee.180
But what “makes more sense” should not be the focus. There is no question
that the floating check issue places a debtor in a problematic situation. The funds
that were in the debtor’s checking account on the date the debtor files for
bankruptcy are no longer available. Accordingly, this will likely require the debtor
to pay the funds twice—once to the payees to whom the checks were originally
payable, and a second time to the trustee.181 Admittedly, this result might go
179

Pyatt, 348 B.R. at 786. The court also explained:

If a trustee recovers from creditors who receive the postpetition transfers of the
kind at issue here, those creditors’ claims can could [sic] be reinstated to the
extent of the recovery, and the trustee could then equally distribute that recovery
among all of the unsecured creditors. In contrast, if a debtor is held accountable
for checks cashed postpetition (and actually has the money to repay those
funds), the trustee’s subsequent distribution of those funds would not be equal
among creditors because the creditors who have received the unauthorized
postpetition transfers will have already been paid 100 percent of what they were
owed (to the extent of the transfers), whereas other creditors would most likely
receive less than 100 percent.
Id.

180

Id. at 787 (emphasis added).
In most cases, the debtor is not purposefully cheating the bankruptcy estate.
Rather, the debtor likely wrote valid checks in the ordinary course with the belief that the
checks would clear prior to filing for bankruptcy. In In re Ruiz, for example, several of the
checks were made as necessary business expenses, including hay and feed for livestock,
which, by the time the trustee made demand for turnover, had been consumed by debtors’
livestock. In re Ruiz, 440 B.R. 197, 199 (Bankr. D. Utah 2010).
181
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against the Bankruptcy Code’s policy of providing a debtor with a “fresh start”
through bankruptcy. However, allowing the trustee to recover the value of the
funds from the debtor may be in the best interest of the bankruptcy estate and
comports with the trustee’s duties under § 704 of the Bankruptcy Code.
As set forth in Part II, a Chapter 7 trustee is “charged with marshaling the
non-exempt assets of the estate for the benefit of creditors.”182 When prepetition
checks dilute the bankruptcy estate postpetition, the Bankruptcy Code provides
trustees with various nonexclusive remedies to reimburse the estate.183 Some of the
remedies include the following:
[Trustees] can give and rely upon the Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2015(a)(4)
notification to the banks if they have sufficient information to do so.
They can seek to recover the transferred funds from the payees of the
checks by pursuing an avoidance action under § 549. Or, they can seek
recovery of the funds from the debtor without an adversary proceeding
by invoking either the debtor’s duty to surrender under § 521(4) or his
duty to turnover under § 542(a). It is ultimately the trustee’s duty to
collect the property of the estate “as expeditiously as is compatible with
the best interests of the parties in interest.”184
Thus, a plain reading of the Bankruptcy Code indicates that a trustee can
recover the funds from the debtor or the payees of the checks through several
nonexclusive choices.185 As one court has explained, “A Chapter 7 trustee is given
a substantial degree of discretion in deciding how to administer the bankruptcy
estate and his or her actions are governed by a business judgment standard.”186
Accordingly, a trustee has significant discretion in deciding how to maximize the
estate, and her decisions should not be disturbed if they are reasonable under the
182

In re Parker, No. 05-17912, 2008 WL 906570, at *5 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Apr. 3,

2008).

183

Id. (“While the Debtor is correct in asserting that the Trustee could have sought to
recover the funds from the payees of the checks by seeking to avoid the post-petition
transfers, the Debtor does not point to any authority indicating that the Trustee must first
exhaust his other remedies before he can seek turn over from the Debtor.” (citing 11 U.S.C.
§ 549 (2006))).
184
In re Spencer, 362 B.R. 489, 493 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006) (quoting 11 U.S.C. §
704(1)) (adopting the holding of In re Sawyer, 324 B.R. 115 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2005), and
Mauer v. Hedback (In re Maurer), 140 B.R. 744 (D. Minn. 1992)).
185
Debtors in several cases make the argument that in addition to § 549, recovery
should come from the payees of the checks pursuant to § 547 (i.e., preferential transfers).
Section 547 is not applicable. As set forth, supra note 134, a “transfer” occurs when the
check is honored, but not received by the creditor. Thus, with respect to the floating check
controversy, the checks, although issued prepetition, are not honored until after the
bankruptcy is filed, postpetition. Accordingly, the preferential transfer theory asserted by
some debtors is not an option for the trustee to pursue to recover the funds.
186
Beery v. Bonzales (In re Beery), No. 7-94-10504, 2007 WL 1575278, at *6
(Bankr. D.N.M. May 30, 2007) (emphasis added).
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circumstances. This means that the trustee is not required to prosecute the payees
of the checks under § 549 (although she certainly can) if it makes more sense to
pursue the debtor pursuant to § 542(a).
Pyatt and other courts have opposed this position and have failed to consider
the best interests of the estate and the trustee’s “substantial degree of discretion.”187
These courts also disregard the plain language of § 542(a) and instead make
policy-based arguments that the trustee is in the best position to prevent this
situation by immediately notifying the debtor’s banks of the bankruptcy filing.188
Despite misinterpreting the Bankruptcy Code and ignoring the trustee’s duties,
these holdings assume the trustee receives sufficient information to do so within
days or even hours of the commencement of the case.189 More significantly, the
Pyatt court and others assume that the debtor’s statements and schedules will be
filed immediately and contain accurate information relating to the bank accounts,
including (1) account numbers, (2) bank names, and (3) actual amounts in the
accounts. Assuming all of that, courts argue that the trustee has all of the necessary
information to take quick action. In reality, however, those assumptions are far
from accurate.190 As often as not, the debtor’s statements and schedules will be
187

Id.
See Pyatt v. Brown (In re Pyatt), 348 B.R. 783, 785 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006), aff’d,
486 F.3d 423 (8th Cir. 2007).
189
See In re Parker, No. 05-17912, 2008 WL 906570, at *6 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Apr. 3,
2008) (“[T]hese courts place the burden on the trustee, in reliance on the duty imposed
under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2015(a)(4), to notify a debtor’s bank of the
bankruptcy filing so that no further checks would be honored, or to stop payment on any
outstanding checks. If a bank honors a check before receiving notice of the filing, they
assert the trustee could seek to recover from the payee under § 549(a). The problem with
this rationale is that often a debtor’s check may clear post-petition before the trustee is
notified of his appointment, assuming the trustee has been provided with all the
information needed to notify the debtor’s financial institution. More often than not, the
debtor merely discloses a ‘checking account’ on schedule B, without any identifying
account information. In addition, most debtors do not identify outstanding checks at the
time of filing, and it is not until the first meeting of creditors that the trustee learns of these
estate assets.”); In re Spencer, 362 B.R. 489, 493 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006) (“In the present
case (as in many, the Court suspects), the debtors did not identify which bank branches
held their accounts or the applicable account numbers, making it difficult for the trustee to
give the Rule 2015 notification. In addition, had the trustee made the notification, both
banks would likely have frozen the accounts, exposing the debtors to the criminal and civil
penalties that attend returned checks and thwarting their fresh start by rendering the debtors
unable to use their accounts at all. Moreover, most of the checks written and honored postpetition were for a few hundred dollars each. Had the trustee chosen the § 549 route, he
would be burdened with commencing a plethora of § 549 actions to recover two or three
hundred dollars. This would be a poor economy to the estate, not to mention wasteful of the
Court’s time and resources. One could hardly consider it ‘expeditious’ as § 704 requires.”).
190
See, e.g., In re Ruiz, 455 B.R. 745, 754 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2011) (“This case
provides a good example why this is not practical [for the trustee to recover the funds from
others]. This bankruptcy was filed on a Saturday. It would be a rare situation for a panel
trustee to 1) be sitting in his or her office on a weekend, with staff, in the off-chance a
188
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missing or will misstate a piece of crucial information. Indeed, in most cases, the
debtor’s Statement of Financial Affairs will erroneously indicate the balance that
they presumed would be in the account after the checks clear.191 Moreover, under
the Bankruptcy Code, debtors are not required to submit their statements and
schedules until fourteen days after filing the initial petition.192 This fourteen-day
period alone eliminates the trustee’s ability to issue notice of the bankruptcy filing
to the banks in sufficient time to prevent prepetition checks from clearing.
In all reality, the debtors are clearly in the best position to prevent prepetition
checks from diluting the bankruptcy estate:
[D]ebtors (especially those represented by knowledgeable
bankruptcy counsel) are in the best position to prevent this situation.
First, and undoubtedly the most simple solution, is for debtors to wait
until all outstanding checks have cleared the bank before filing their
petition. Second, if immediate filing is required, because of a pending
foreclosure or otherwise, they can stop payment on the outstanding
checks. Third, debtors have the option of simply closing the bank
accounts. Fourth, debtors can contact their banks and provide a notice of
the filing of the bankruptcy petition, creating a duty on the part of the
institutions to not pay the checks. It is true that the latter three options
could theoretically cause debtors criminal problems on the back end, if
someone suggested these steps were taken with the purpose to defraud.
As the concurring opinion notes in In re Pyatt, however, “there is clearly

bankruptcy would be filed; 2) that he would necessarily be the one appointed as the panel
trustee on that new case; 3) that the schedules would show the existence of enough money
in a checking account worth immediately acting on; and 4) that the schedules would
provide sufficient information to allow the trustee to contact any listed banking institutions.
In addition, since all four checks cleared within four days of the bankruptcy filing (and one
the first business day after it was filed), even if the Trustee had mailed the letter the first
business day the case was received, he could not have prevented the check from being
honored.”); In re Parker, 2008 WL 906570, at *5 (noting that “[t]he Debtor did not provide
the Trustee with his account number or the branch where he does his banking. It was not
until the Trustee reviewed the Debtor’s bank account statements that he was able to
ascertain the actual account balance at filing and the Debtor’s account number. Thus, the
Trustee was not in a position to put Trustco Bank on notice of the filing under Federal Rule
of Bankruptcy Procedure 2015(a) prior to the checks at issue being presented for
payment.”).
191
See, e.g., In re Ruiz, 455 B.R. at 754 (“[I]f debtors are not properly counseled, they
may inadvertently indicate in their schedules the balance they show in their check register,
rather than the accurate amount actually still within their account. That is what appears to
have happened here; Debtors listed the account with $10.02 balance instead of the actual
amount of $3,764.99. Since panel trustees stand to only receive $60 in a no-asset case, the
system is not set up to require those same trustees to spend their personal assets to seize a
$10 bank account.”).
192
FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(c).
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no purpose to defraud if a bankruptcy debtor stops payment on a check in
fulfillment of the debtor’s duties under a federal statute.”193
Although trustees may have other remedies available, the Bankruptcy Code
clearly allows a trustee, pursuant to § 542(a), to recover property of the estate
directly from the debtor. Trustees often do not have enough information in a short
enough period of time to give the Rule 2015 notification. In addition, even if a
trustee did have the information soon enough and issued the notification with
sufficient dispatch, banks would likely freeze the account, exposing the debtor to
the very criminal or civil penalties the Pyatt court refers to in arguing debtors have
no duty to issue stop orders on prepetition checks.194 In other words, the
“potential” criminal liability would appear to attach regardless of who prevented
the checks from clearing.195 But a debtor’s compliance with her duty under a
federal statute vitiates any purpose to defraud, and such an argument is nothing
more than a red herring.196
Moreover, it is often several, relatively insignificant prepetition checks that
are honored postpetition. If the trustee were forced to pursue such transfers under §
549, as several courts suggest, she would be forced to commence several separate
actions to recover each individual amount.197 As a practical consideration,
requiring a Chapter 7 trustee to chase down multiple transferees who received
postpetition transfers will often be impossible or extremely burdensome. In fact,
the Bankruptcy Code discourages—possibly prohibits—the trustee from doing so.
Section 704(a)(1) requires the trustee to collect property of the estate and “close
193

In re Schoonover, No. 05-43662-7, 2006 WL 3093649, at *3 (Bankr. D. Kan. Oct.
30, 2006) (quoting Pyatt, 348 B.R. at 787 n.13 (Kressel, J., concurring)).
194
See Pyatt, 348 B.R. at 786–87.
195
As noted by one court, “[M]any, if not most, jurisdictions require the state to prove
actual intent to defraud when prosecuting an individual for writing a bad check.” In re
Ruiz, 455 B.R. at 753 n.26.
196
See, e.g., In re Schoonover, 2006 WL 3093649, at *3 (“It is true that the latter
three options could theoretically cause debtors criminal problems on the back end, if
someone suggested these steps were taken with the purpose to defraud. As the concurring
opinion notes in Pyatt, however, ‘there is clearly no purpose to defraud if a bankruptcy
debtor stops payment on a check in fulfillment of the debtor’s duties under a federal
statute.’”).
197
As the In re Ruiz court noted:
One must also remember . . . that if the Trustee brought an action to avoid the
post-petition transfer under § 549, and recovered that transfer for the estate
under § 550, the holder of the note secured by the mortgage, for example, would
be entitled to a claim under § 502(h) for the amount it was required to return to
the Trustee. That claim would retain its secured status, leaving Debtors in the
same position with regard to the amount of money they owed the note holder on
the secured claim.
455 B.R. at 752 n.23.
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such estate as expeditiously as is compatible with the best interests of parties in
interest.”198 This duty is also “required by implication from other provisions in the
Code and in the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, especially Rule 1001,
which provides that the rules shall be construed to secure the just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every case.”199
In short, it is the trustee’s duty to the bankruptcy estate’s creditors to realize
from the estate all that is possible for distribution among creditors and to this end
the trustee’s best option—at times—may be to pursue the debtor for the value of
the funds instead of chasing down multiple creditors, most of whom have already
been harmed by the debtor’s bankruptcy filing. By recovering from the debtor, the
trustee can recover the value of all of the prepetition checks from one source
without initiating a single adversary proceeding. In several cases, such action
would be in the best interest of the bankruptcy estate and would comport with the
trustee’s duties under the Bankruptcy Code.
Furthermore, placing the onus on the debtor to reimburse the estate makes the
most sense because the debtor is in the best position to prevent prepetition checks
from clearing postpetition. Only the debtor has the ability to conduct the
appropriate prepetition planning to prevent this scenario from arising. Indeed, an
informed debtor is aware that by filing bankruptcy she is establishing the
bankruptcy estate. She has knowledge that any balance in her accounts on the
petition date becomes property of the estate. Thus, the simplest solution is for the
debtor to conduct the appropriate prepetition planning and wait until all
outstanding checks have cleared before filing her petition. In no way does this
prevent the debtor from paying ordinary bills prepetition.
Rather, it just requires that she take certain steps to ensure that payments clear
the bank prior to filing. This can be as simple as using cash or cashier’s checks in
the period before filing. Moreover, if immediate filing is necessary, the debtor is in
the best position to prevent any outstanding prepetition checks from clearing. For
instance, the debtor can (1) put stop payment orders on the checks, (2) give the
bank notice of the bankruptcy filing, or even (3) withdraw the funds and close the
bank account.
Ultimately, the policy-based arguments should not overshadow the plain text
of § 542(a) and courts should not be spending time determining which way the
various policy arguments cut. As noted by one court, “We are not free to impose
our wishes to fashion an exception to the sometimes harsh results of section
542(a).”200 Furthermore, it is not the “[c]ourt’s duty to create policy, but that of
Congress.”201 Thus, “while judges might crave the freedom to always decree what
198
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is equitable and socially useful in the cases before [them] the Supreme Court says
that [judges] do not possess it when a statute or rule provides clear direction.”202
This plain meaning rule has even greater force when applied to the text of the
Bankruptcy Code:
Initially, it is worth recalling that Congress worked on the
formulation of the Code for nearly a decade. It was intended to
modernize the bankruptcy laws, and as a result made significant changes
in both the substantive and procedural laws of bankruptcy . . . . In such a
substantial overhaul of the system, it is not appropriate or realistic to
expect Congress to have explained with particularity each step it took.
Rather, as long as the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, there
generally is no need for a court to inquire beyond the plain language of
the statute. The task of resolving the dispute over the meaning [of a
statute] begins where all such inquiries must begin: with the language of
the statute itself.203
The provisions of § 542(a) are clear, and allowing a trustee to recover the
value of the funds from the debtor further comport with his duties under the
Bankruptcy Code. And although a literal interpretation of § 542(a) may produce
results that Congress may not have foreseen, legislation is the function of
Congress, and Congress, not bankruptcy judges, must rewrite the Bankruptcy
Code. The Supreme Court’s mandate for statutory construction clearly requires
bankruptcy courts to enforce the plain meaning of a facially clear statute, in spite
of policy implications or pre-Code practices to the contrary. Thus, under the
analysis set forth above, even if the trustee is in a better position (which she is not)
and has the option of recovering from others (which she does), in no way does that
affect her right to recover from the debtor pursuant to § 542(a).
The question is not who is in a better position or whether there will be
unfortunate results. The question is what the Bankruptcy Code requires and what is
in the best interests of the estate. Bankruptcy courts cannot disregard the clear
provisions of federal and state law, which provide, at a minimum, that (1) a
debtor’s interest in her bank account becomes property of the estate when she files
her petition, and (2) although a debtor may not have possession of the funds
represented by the checks written to creditors, she undeniably has control if the
bank has not authorized, as a payor bank, final payment on such checks. Once the
payor bank authorizes payment and the debtor no longer has possession or control
of the funds, § 542(a) clearly entitles the trustee to a money judgment for the
“value” of the funds. This result not only follows the plain meaning of § 542(a),
but it is the only result that comports with the trustee’s duty to realize from the
202
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estate all that is possible for distribution among creditors and “close such estate as
expeditiously as is compatible with the best interests of parties in interest.”204
CONCLUSION
If a debtor writes checks against funds prepetition, but the checks do not clear
the debtor’s account until after she files for bankruptcy, the trustee is entitled to a
money judgment against the debtor for the value of the funds. Not only does this
view comport with the clear text of § 542(a), it also may be the most practical and
efficient way to maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate. The text of § 542(a)
is clear. An entity in possession, custody, or control of property of the estate during
the bankruptcy case “shall deliver to the trustee, and account for, such property or
the value of such property.”205 Property of the estate is defined to include “all legal
or equitable interests of the debtor.”206 Funds on deposit in a debtor’s bank account
are undeniably property of the bankruptcy estate.
This is true even if the debtor writes checks against the funds prepetition, but
the checks do not clear the debtor’s account until after she files for bankruptcy. Up
until the time the debtor’s checks are presented for payment, the debtor retains
control over the balance in her account. She can close the account, withdraw the
funds, or stop payment on the checks, regardless of any outstanding checks. This
undeniably amounts to “possession, custody, or control” within the meaning of
§ 542(a). Furthermore, the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code altered the pre-Code
present possession or control requirement because § 542(a) expressly permits a
trustee to recover “the value” of the property, in addition to the property itself,
from one who possessed the property at any time “during the [bankruptcy] case.”
Thus, present possession is no longer a prerequisite to turnover liability. Under
such circumstances, a trustee can proceed directly against the debtor under
§ 542(a) and courts are constrained by the Bankruptcy Code to hold the debtor
liable to the estate for the value of the checks written prepetition, but cashed
postpetition.
While it is undoubtedly challenging for the debtor to pay twice and
experience the “fresh start” intended by bankruptcy, the burden on the debtor is
entirely irrelevant. It is well within the law and the trustee’s sound discretion to
decide to recover the payments from the debtor instead of the payees under
§ 542(a). This result not only follows the plain meaning of § 542(a), but—at
times—it is the only result that comports with the trustee’s duty to realize from the
estate all that is possible for distribution among creditors and “close such estate as
expeditiously as is compatible with the best interests of parties in interest.”207
While this may be an unfortunate result, it is entirely avoidable by prepetition
planning on the debtor’s part. Debtors seeking to avoid the unpleasant result of
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multiple payments should be certain that any checks they write prepetition have
cleared before they file for bankruptcy. If immediate filing is necessary, the debtor
can place stop payment orders on the checks, give the bank notice of the
bankruptcy filing, or even withdraw the funds and close the bank account.

